The Breguet 690: A good design, better suited for recce than the still fair Potez 630... (revised 01 / 07 / 2014)

The French twin-engined fighters program, a characteristic fossil of the 30's

Like the Potez 630 and the Hanriot 220, the Bréguet 690 was an answer to the multi-engined fighters program of 1934 published by the French Armée de l'Air. 

This program was asking for a twin-engined fighter with 3 crew members and a maximum weight of 3,500 kg (7,715 lb). 

One might wonder: Why as much as 3 men for such a lightweight plane and why a so drastically limited loaded weight, forbidding any use of powerful engines? 

The engines initially chosen by the deciders (as usual in the 1935 France) for these planes were the Hispano-Suiza 14 Ha, later designed as 14 AB, at their very early prototype stage (!).

The Potez 630, first ready to fly

The Potez being first ready to fly in 1936, received the first engines, which were, of course, completely unreliable. 

During that year, nevertheless the Potez showed outstanding flying qualities, reaching its contractual speed (460 kph) and climbing fast (4000 m in 7 minutes). 

Obviously, an official order followed in 1937 and, thanks to the good engineering process of the Potez team, began to be really mass produced by the mid of the 1938 year. 

The main part of the Potez production was dedicated to the recce with two subtypes: Potez 637 and 63.11. 


A recco variant, the Potez 637, à peine plus lent que le chasseur à cause de la petite gondole ventrale réservée à l'officier observateur. 
A la masse de 4121.5 kg au décollage, les vitesse en étaient : 367 km/h           au niveau de la mer, 403 km/h             à 2 000 m,439 km/h             à 4 000 m,448 km/h             à  5 000 m,446 km/h             à 6 000 m,428 km/h             à 8 000 m,  La vitesse de croisière économique de 320 km/h permettait de franchir 1435 km. Plein gaz, donc à 448 km/h, il pouvait franchir 740 km. A 80 % de la puissance maximale, il pouvait franchir 1390 km à 415 km/h. Les temps de montée étaient tout à fait corrects :    3' 02"             pour 2 000 m,  6' 09"             pour 4 000 m,  9' 14"             pour 6 000 m,16' 48"             pour 8 000 m,

Le plafond dépassait 9500 m. Cet avion était irrattrapable pour des Bf 109 B, C ou D. Sa maniabilité en faisait une cible difficile à très basse altitude par la variante Emil.

Unfortunately, both were insufficiently fast to do safely such a job! 

Among the 730 Potez 63.11 produced, 220 were destroyed by the Jagdwaffe...

The Bréguet 690, second to fly...

It resulted - from the weak stage of perfecting of the Hispano-Suiza engines - one full year of waiting before the Bréguet fighter can receive her engines and fly!

Finally, with these so lately provided engines, the Bréguet 690 fighter demonstrated also very good flying qualities and very better performances: 

• 390 kph at        0 m, 

• 430 kph at  2000 m,

• 475 kph at  4000 m,

• 490 kph at  5000 m.

These motors were not sufficiently reliable, so it was necessary to change them for Gnome-Rhône (SNECMA) 14 M - 0.96 m in diameter - which impressed the Germans so much so that they used them for the Henschel 129 B and C tank busters. 

The new plane was designated as the Br. 693.

Bréguet 693 - the fastest of the lightweight multipurpose twin-engined French planes

Dedicated to ground attack

An order followed to create a ground strike force completely new for France, with resulted in a true efficient experience on the hedge-hopping flight, but without any clear awareness about the German AA fires (Flak) capacities. 

The Bréguet had self sealing tanks and light armor plates.

A grand total of 225 were produced before the June, 14, when the German troops entered in Paris.

The released planes fought gallantly against the Panzer columns until the last days. Little by little, their tactics became more safe and more dangerous for the enemy.

Unfortunately, they were among the first (with numerous Fairey Battle) to learn the awful efficiency of the 20 mm Flak. 

Even at the end of the conflict, Allied pilots have lost their precious life while trying a second firing flight over Flak protected areas. 

But, at the very beginning of the Battle of France, this lesson was a complete surprise.

A wasted chance

If the Bréguet team had used the wasted year to adapt their beautiful plane to the liquid-cooled inline Hispano-Suiza 12 X engines, the history would have been completely different. 

These "unbreakable" engines, slightly more powerful, allowed a much more aerodynamic cowling. 

The Br. 690 would have reached at least 510 - 520 kph and a higher service ceiling. 

As a recce plane, she would be more successful with less casualties than both the Potez 637 and the Potez 63-11. 

The fore fuselage allowed a more interesting place for an observer. 

The considerably better speed would have induced shorter mission time, this being an efficient protection against the German fighters.



May be, her derivatives with more powerful engines, as the dreadful Br 700, could have issued some true valuable long range fighters, culminating in the the Br. 820, to see here (http://aerophile.over-blog.com/article-un-projet-celui-du-breguet-820-48349675.html) forerunner of the lovely De Haviland Hornet.

Nieuport 161 and Morane 405 - Learning from planes crashes... or not... (revised 09 / 22 / 2014)

What kind of engine was fitted in the Nieuport 161 - 02?

At first, I need to go back about the Nieuport 161 to give a more comprehensive picture of this fighter.

The top speed I computed for this fighter - from 485 to 490 kph (see my previous post here) was based on papers publishing that the engine fitted on her (prototype #02, flying since September 1937) was an Hispano-Suiza 12 Ycrs providing 860 hp at 3,150 m, inducing that the best performance would be reached at about 4,500 m ASL.

It’s true, however, than the Morane-Saulnier MS 405-02, which flew a bit earlier in 1937, used a 920 Cv engine allowing her to reach 483 kph at 5,000 m (this engine was a prototype of the 12 Y 29). 

It is the only credible French measure for the Morane 405 (given by G. Botquin in l'épopée du Morane 406, le Fanatique de l'Aviation, #100, p. 31, 1978) before the one obtained by the MS 405 #12, fitted with the 12 Y 45 engine and reaching 493 kph.

If the same HS 12 Y 29 engine have been fitted on the Nieuport 161, the engine providing its maximum output 350 m higher than the 12 Ycrs, the top speed must be reached, at least, at an altitude of 5,000 m, 1,000 m higher than the speed of 478 kph at 4,000 m published. 
Indeed, the speed increment would be more than 20 kph, pushing the top speed over the 500 kph threshold. 

The difference of 17 km/h with the Morane-Saulnier 405-02 / 406 would have been less important but always significant.

However, the climbing performances of the N 161 will stay better than those of the MS 406. 

Regarding the Morane, the only credible climbing value was the one given by the CEAM who experimented the Bloch 152 fighter against the MS 405 #13 in December 1939 and reported the Morane, with her HS 12 Y 51 engine providing 1,000 hp, climbed to 4,000 m in 5’11” and to 8,000 m in 13’12”.

The last published climbing performance of the Nieuport 161 was 8’22” to reach 6,000 m, an average speed of 11.95 m/s (very near from 12 m/s) from sea level.

The climbing speed measured by Finnish pilots flying MS 406/410 was 5’30” for 3000 m and 10’00” for ,5000 m (http://www.oocities.org/finnmilpge/fmp_faf_fighters.html) . 

The very better Mörkö Morane, fitted with a Klimov M 105 P (1,050 hp at 4,000 m) needed 8’00” to climb to 5,000 m, giving a average ratio of 10.4 m/s.

Indeed, it was impossible for the MS 406 to climb to 4,000 m in significantly less than 7’.

The CEMA didn't spare Nieuport

From the other hand, fitting the up to date Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 29 on the Nieuport 161-02 was completely unlikely. 

The Morane 406, being ordered, was tightly “protected” by the State services very influential deciders. 

The managers of the Hispano-Suiza company never had another choice: The best engines must be provided to the chosen standard fighter.  

An illustration of this policy might be found in the 1938 fighter program: These wanted completely new planes which must fly faster than 560 kph. 

The first plane to fly was the D.520-01 with a 12 Y 29 engine (920 Cv at 3,600 m ==> 527 kph at 5,000 m).

The second was the CAO 200-01 with a 12 Y 31 engine (860 hp at 3,150 m ==> 535 kph without exhaust pipes and 552 kph with that device).

The third was the Morane 450 with a 12 Y 51 engine (1,000 hp at 3,150 m -> 560 kph). 

The fourth was the Arsenal VG 33-01 with a 12 Y 31 engine (860 hp at 3,150 m –> 558 kph with that device)

Clearly, the Morane company was favored and the SNCAO (ex Nieuport) was not favored at all. 

With the same 1,000 hp engine, the very advanced CAO 200 could reach 595 kph, matching clearly with the Bf 109 F and the Spitfire V fighters.

Another argument reinforcing the previous one, is the one engineer Louis Bonte, the most influential decider who favored unduly the Morane 406, told us in his book “Histoire des Essais en Vol, Docavia #3, 1974". 

He wrote that the first of these Nieuport fighters family, the 160, fitted with an Hispano 12X engine providing 690 hp, met barely the specifications of the program. 

In the site http://www.aviastar.org/air/france/nieuport-160.php, you can read a confirmation of that : The top speed of the Nieuport 160 was 440 kph, which is consistent with a top speed close to 500 kph with the 860 hp.

The second Nieuport 161 accident

Another point I must discuss is the second accident occurred to the Nieuport 161-02 in January 1938. 

It happened during trials for extra short landings, needed to satisfy the French Air administration. 

Such trials imply to fly at slow speed, while the stall is imminent. 

In such case of flight, both the pilot and the plane are at risk. 

You are flying at high angle, the forward view is very poor, so you don’t  have a good perception of the situation. 

The rudder becomes the safer command because each excessive action on the ailerons will trigger a spin, at very low altitude: No comment!

Obviously, you have few choices to correct any error or any sudden change of the wind speed. 

A lot of accidents are the consequences of such flights at slow speed. 

For myself, I remember it was a terrific experiment – with my very quiet instructor and a very maneuverable and safe Morane Rallye - but I’ve never wanted to repeat it.

In the France of 1938, the rules, decreed in 1934, just before the generalization of the retractable undercarriage and of streamlined fighter planes, were common for all airplanes, all of them must satisfy exactly the same performances. 

For the landing, it was requested a maximum distance of 450 m after passing a 8 m virtual “tree”, with a wind speed slower than 2.5 m/s. 

Obviously, such a trial was easy for all the old slow biplanes, but was much more difficult for very clean fighters, as that was perfectly illustrated by the Nieuport 161. 

It may be added that the Nieuport fighter had a large span for its wings (11 m), with an aspect ratio of 8 (the MS 406 wings had 6.63). So the ground effect was very powerful.

Interesting data on this subject are found during the trials of 3 configurations of the Spitfire Mk I.

With the fixed pitch wooden air screw, the Spit needed 725 m to stop after a 15 m obstacle: this distance fell to 200 m with the Rotol constant speed air screw (and also with a 500 lb lighter plane than the operational ones).

The French test pilot Fernand Lefèvre, tired or embarrassed by another plane, crashed the Nieuport without injuries (and the fighter was able to be repaired but the deciders did not want).

This incident was especially used together with the first crash of September 1936 to vilified the Nieuport 161. 

But another plane suffered from a similar crash during the same test: A Caudron Simoun, which was, also, a very clean aircraft.   

Two of the men imposing these tests had left - 40 years later - a mocking description of these two crashes, demonstrating how they were arrogant and irresponsible (Histoire des Essais en Vol, Docavia #3, 1974). 

I cannot blame the pilot lefèvre, because flying at slow speed is like a random game.

Nevertheless, using the same rules for ultra light slow planes (e.g. Piper J3) and for fighter flying more than 3 times faster was awkward, and the deciders demonstrated a complete lack of common sense, because any routine test would never be the cause of accident.

The Morane, also, suffered 2 accidents!

The Morane 405, also, suffered 2 accidents, just a bit later, unfortunately for the French Armies. 

The first accident occurred on the landing of the Lithuanian pilot Capt. Mikenas, written off the MS 405-01: For 2 sources, he died but, for a more recent source, he was only injured. 
As usual, it was said that the pilot was responsible.

The second accident occurred during an attempt to reach the ceiling of the prototype MS 405-02 by the Morane test pilot Mr. Ribière. 

In the August 5, 1937, in the aeronautic review Les Ailes (= The Wings), it was reported that the July 28, Ribière was testing the ceiling of the Morane 405-02, taking off from Villacoublay.

After half-an-hour of climbing, the witness had seen the Morane diving almost vertically at vertiginous speed, hitting the ground and exploding in fire.

It was written "the fighter design was in no way the origin of this crash". 

They described the graphical barometric record, displaying a regular climbing interrupted suddenly by a vertical dive until the ground level. 
No pilot action was detected, so the crash was attributed to a fainting fit of the pilot occurring during the climbing.

It was claimed the supply oxygen device was thoroughly tested.

Nevertheless, such a crash may be easily related to the poor climbing ability of the Morane fighter, which was confirmed in the French handbook for the Curtiss P 36 A 1 (chapter I, end of the section entitled procédés de combat): There, you can read that, if the Curtiss climbed to 7,000 m in 11 minutes, the Morane 406 needed 18 minutes to reach the same altitude. 

This fighter being able to reach 5,000 m in 10 minutes (each 1,000 m step in an average time of 2 minutes), she needed an average time of 4 minutes to climb each new step.

So, the 8,000 m needed at least 24 minutes and a supplementary 1,000 m altitude step exceeded easily 35 to 40 minutes. 

That may be seen as a sufficiently long time for the freezing of some parts of the oxygen supply device.

I've read an interview of Michel Détroyat where he claimed the fighters will have no reason to fly at very high altitude, because that was very uncomfortable. 

So, we know why the test pilots of the MS 406 never flew at high altitude.

Otherwise they could have identified the freezing of the weapons and the oxygen problem. It could had helped to save many pilot’s life during the War...

So, it's logically impossible to accept the design of the Morane-Saulnier fighter was no responsible of the Ribière's crash!

And a bad climbing ability was a good motive to reject this fighter (as all other bad climber ones).

As you have understood, the Nieuport 161 demonstrated her ability to fly up to 11,250 m, where she reached a 328 kph speed. 

This was expected from a plane designed by a company which had got several times the world record of altitude and was accustomed to elaborate efficient fighting planes. 

Nieuport 161: 09-22-1936, the day at which France had lost the mastery of the 1940 sky (revised 01/ 05 / 2014)

A fatal crash

The Nieuport 161 was rejected after a lethal crash occurred the September 22, 1936, which killed her test pilot, captain-engineer  Coffinet.

For the eye-witness, the crash seemed not linked to any misconception of the fighter.

Nevertheless, all the following events were running as if the crash was the consequence of some faulty conception.

The order of 30 planes (already on the desk of Pierre Cot, then Ministre de l'Air) was a little after forgotten...

A then-official theory for the crash

The only published analysis was the one that General-Engineer Louis Bonte and Jacques Lecarme have written in their book Histoire des essais en vol (Docavia #3, Larivière, 1974). 

It was quietly recopied since that day in every paper on that fighter. 

However, as every scientist, I never accepted to be a "quiet" man, and, because the Morane 406 was hopelessly outclassed by the Bf 109 E, I was interested on the French fighter contest programmed in 1934.


The official theory of Mr Bonte was the crash was due "to the cooling device, which induced - during some particular flying pattern - a stall affecting all the center part of the wings, with a steep slope at 15 to 20 m/s vertical speed."

It exist no historical document supporting the Bonte thesis. I've red an undated and not authenticated document which was clearly written after 1945 in which this thesis appear. But this document never explain the aerodynamic experiences allowing such conclusion.

So, such a final judgement needs, at least, some discussion.

The cooling device of the Nieuport was an original feature of the Nieuport Team.


It has been fitted in each wing, near the fuselage. 

The air intakes were beneath each wing (almost at the mid-chord) and the exit way for the hot air was on the upper side of the wing just in front of the flaps (in order to benefit from the depression created by the air-stream existing on the upper surface of the wing). 

This device was demonstrated in some handbook for French students in aeronautical schools in the early 60's, without any adverse warning.

Document of the author - Left wing of the Nieuport 161 - The cooling device exit is the little black stain on the right part of the wing

I was never convinced by the Bonte's theory  

Several facts are clearly against such a theory.

Even if it would be experimentally proven, it could be possible to fix such a bug by displacing the cooling device beneath the center fuselage as in the Hurricane, the Avia 534 or the Mureaux 170.

It was also possible to put wing fences to limit the stalled zone (if it really existed) only to the cooling device zone itself.


Moreover, two years after the crash, the same Nieuport team developed successfully a family of fighter-bombers to be used on the French aircraft carriers: The Loire-Nieuport 40, 41, 401, 402 and 411.

They were straight forward derivatives of the N 161,  sharing her fuselage and... her cooling device.


All of them were operationally used and fought gallantly with the Aéronavale in May 1940, operating dive bombing as also fighting duties (they accounted one victory on a German bomber). 

Moreover, they have also recorded several landing on the Béarn carrier without displaying any problem.

To my knowledge, such tests on an aircraft carrier were be seen everywhere as the best method to detect any loss of lift!


Another point against the Bonte's theory is given by the Dewoitine D.520-01 fighter prototype. 

The October 2, 1938, when this completely different fighter flew for the first time, she used a very similar cooling device and her test pilot Marcel Doret was very satisfied by her flying qualities which he already evaluated as outstanding.

A good picture may be seen on the very good site of Joseph Bibert. You can see the Dewoitine 520-01 prototype displaying, just to the left of her left Karman, the exit of her left radiator. 

Compared with the Nieuport 161 fitting, this exit was clearly more up-stream.

This cooling device was discarded several flights later, only owing to its poor cooling performances.

Bonte's theory origin

OK, you may now wonder: What would be the Bonte's theory origin?

I've found it while reading a Docavia Book on the Avion Bernard company which developed some very advanced aircrafts for their times, even an absolute World Air Speed record breaker in 1924. 

None of these aircrafts were issued into production because that company was only a system to wash money or funds... 


As usual in such a case, the high staff of the company said to the engineers that the problem was the Nieuport concurrent which have got dishonestly several orders...

These engineers provided Louis Bonte the theory stemming from one of their own experiment: They developed a civilian plane, the Bernard 200 T (T for tourism) in the early 30's. 
From the beginning, this plane displayed abnormal difficulties to take off and, thereafter, to climb. 
The reason lied in the wing structure which can be folded in 2 orthogonal directions, the first one, classical, parallel to the longitudinal axis of the plane, the second one orthogonal to the previous one and parallel to the ailerons.

Personal document of the author - Starboard wing of the Bernard 200 T -
Axis 2 generated  the secondary folding device, creating the slot in the wing

Unexpectedly, this second fold opened a 2 cm wide vertical slot between the lower and the upper surface of the wing, destroying a lot of lift. 

After obstructing of the slot with fabric, the plane flew normally.


Comparing the huge slot affecting each wing of the Bernard T 200 with the small exit of the Nieuport cooling device (see at the two previous figures) seems not relevant at all.

It is also difficult to explain an extension of the stall perpendicularly to the airflow over a large distance so close to the trailing edge.


Logically, the air exiting from the Nieuport device was very hot, so it must be accelerated with a small angle to the airflow and might had induced something like a moderate Coanda effect.

If the lift was reduced, even a little, the climbing speed must have been slow, as it was perfectly measured during the Bernard T 200 trials. 


That was not the case for the Nieuport 161 case, this fighter had, by far, the best climbing performances of all French fighters until the trials of the record breaker Dewoitine 550.

So, I hope you are now convinced the Bonte theory is no more relevant.

A more likely crash theory

Now, I want give my personal explanation to the Captain Coffinet crash.

From the paper of Arnaud Prudhomme in Air Magazine, April 2005, the crash occurred during a gun firing trial, while the pilot was recovering after a dive to shot a ground target.


That test followed the idea that fighters will be able to destroy tanks with their guns (the idea was not bad, but a little too early).

Personal collection of the author - Drawing of the attack of an armored column by fighters
in P. Barjot, l'aviation militaire française en 1939, de Gigord ed.

A question arise for us, ~80 years later: In 1935, the D 500 fighters flew, at most, at 365 kph in horizontal fly. 

So, during a dive, they can reach about 450-500 kph. 

Her fixed undercarriage as her fixed pitch air-screw were powerful brakes. 

The pilots had no difficulties to do such a job.


One year later, all the aerodynamic "landscape" was different. 

The new fighters exceeded easily the 700 kph in dive, the best exceeding 800 kph.

The g's number arose from less than 3 to more than 6: The same sketch became lethal. 


Yet, the Nieuport 161 was the fastest and, by far, the most streamlined among all the French fighters.

If Captain Coffinet followed too exactly the scheme of the test, he was in great danger. 

But, he cannot be blamed for the crash.


So, the only persons to be blamed were the men who ordered such a trial without taking care themselves about the performances of the new fighters which fly very faster than the previous ones.

Other prototypes of this period had also suffered from crash, the most famous one being the Messerschmitt Bf 109, but also a lot of diving planes everywhere.


The French Air Forces Staff ordered the Morane 405... and the History of the French defeat began.


A other post displays the assets of the N 161. You can read it by clicking here.

The Nieuport 161 - The best French Fighter against the Luftwaffe (Upgraded 26 / 09 / 2023 ***)

The choice of a fighter is of paramount strategical importance

Why the choice of the Morane 406 fighter instead of the Nieuport 161 one was a big mistake?

Because, in 1936, a lot of educated persons in France were anxious about a new war. 

Some other remained blind, as were some union's leaders or lobby's leader.


To be honest, ordering a moderate bomber was never a problem, as a bomber is no more than a flying lorry carrying bombs. 


Any bomber needs fighter protection but some few special ones, like the British Mosquito, the French Mirage IV and the US B2 for different reasons (if the B17, B29 and B52 were really superlative daylight bombers, they experienced difficulties when used without fighter escort against a strong aerial opposition).


For the German troops, the Campaign of France in 1940 was not as easy as it was told everywhere. 

The more recent estimates increased their KIA toll close to 50,000, about twice the amount published by General Guderian in his memories. 

For only 44 days, that was very heavy casualties. 


The Battle of Verdun lasted about 10 months with a monthly average death toll of 15,000 German KIA (and 16,700 French soldiers). 

The crucial criteria

Today, knowing how narrow was the margin enabling the success of the Guderian's Blitzkrieg and the crucial part played by the German dive bombers on the battlefield, my personal opinion is: The choice of the Morane 406 against the Nieuport 161 was a serious mistake, even if other serious problems were remaining.

On the contrary to the bomber choice, ordering a fighter - the only kind of aircraft able to obtain the mastery of the Air - must be made, even today, always thoroughly. 

The actual criteria were, at least, five:

• A sufficient speed to catch as quickly as possible the bombers actually in development everywhere (= able to fly at 300 mph or 484 kph);

• A climbing speed enabling to shot down any spy plane flying higher than 8,000 m before she goes home with her precious informations;

• At least one capacity allowing to break the combat to save the precious pilot's life when necessary (e.g. when the fighter has no more ammunition);

• A cockpit enabling the pilot to have the better possible situation awareness;

• A general layout allowing a fast mass construction.

The Nieuport was the only one French 1936 fighter fulfilling all these 5 exigences

The Nieuport 161 fighter, as she was in August 1936 (480 kph +), was able to catch all the 1940 enemy bombers, at least as easily as did the Hawker Hurricane Mk I.

She was also able to intercept all the strategic enemy spy planes (8,000 m reached in 12'03") as easily, at least, as the Spitfire Mk I of June 1940 (8,000 m reached in 16' 30"). 

So, the N 161 satisfied the two first criteria the Morane 406 failed completely (speed < 450 kph, 7,000 m reached in 18')! (source: Handbook for the French pilots flying the Curtiss P 36).

The all-round vision of the Nieuport fighter enabled by her cockpit canopy gave her pilots a far better situation awareness than any other actual fighters in Europe: So, she satisfied  the 4th criterion. 

That was not the case for the Morane 406. 

Nieuport 161-01 - This picture was modified by myself. It was published in the French Revue du Ministère de l'Air for the Paris Air Show 1936: An all-round sight was obtained.

The all-metallic structure of the Nieuport fighter and her modular assembly allowed a very shorter time to build her than the Morane 406, which, as it was written classically, needed 17,000 h at best. 

I re-evaluated her official producing time as greatly underestimated since I know the 22,000 to 24,000 hours needed by the Macchi MC 200 Italian fighter, whose was structurally much more modern! 

So, taking into account the 30 N 161 fighters to-be-ordered just before the September 22, 1936, crash - the sense of such an amount, to be compared with the order for only 16 Morane 405, may have the sense of a better initial confidence in the Nieuport fighter.

The amount of Nieuport fighters available in September 1939 would have been easily higher than the 572 Morane.

So, the N 161 could have fulfilled the 5 th criterion, and we know perfectly it was never the case for the Morane 406.


The third criterion is not easy to establish, owing to the weak number of Nieuport fighters that have flown and the total absence, to my knowledge, of handling and maneuverability test report from the CEMA.

I wrote that sentence in February 2012. 

In Spring of 2017, I received from my good friends Pierre-Yves and Jean-François Hénin, a report about a meeting gathering the Ministre de l'Air Guy La Chambre, in the first half of 1938, Mr. Michel Détroyat, who was the personal referee pilot of the minister and some high ranked officers of the Armée de l'Air.

The purpose of the meeting was to decide which fighter, among the Bloch 150 and the Nieuport 161, was to be built in mass production. 

Regarding the flying qualities of Nieuport 161, Détroyat said: "This fighter is as easy [to fly] as the Morane 406, except her commands which are a bit less efficient." 

The Air ministre, Mr Guy La Chambre asked Détroyat to compare the Nieuport 161 to the Bloch 150, Détroyat answered: 

"There is no possible comparison between these fighters: Owing her ease of handling, the Nieuport 161 is the only fighter that most of the French military pilots can fly".

Moreover, two of the criteria, the 2nd and the 4th, gave her a good escape capability.

One may add to these facts the curious adventure the prototype 03 (which flew first in March 1938) was ready to begin when the Germans attacked in May 1940.

She was intended to experiment a device of engineer De Raucourt to cut the metallic cables which were anchoring anti-aerial defense balloons to the ground!

Really, did you think such an amazing task might be experimented with an unmaneuverable, or nasty, or difficult-to-fly plane ? 

In my personal opinion, the criticism about the flying qualities of the Nieuport 161 had only one goal: To favor the order the Morane-Saulnier fighter (or, after the war, to justify this stupid choice).


One may use of the traditional criterion of the wing loading. 

The Ni 161 had 152 kg/m² and the Morane 406 had 141 kg/m². 

The difference was of the same order of magnitude than the difference between the Spitfire Mk I and the Spitfire Mk II, the British test pilots seemed to feel quite identical in maneuverability. 

But, thank to her better aerodynamics, the Nieuport fighter did not lose so quickly her speed during maneuvers as did the MS 406.

The Nieuport 161 was very easily upgradable

Fitted with a simple ejector exhaust manifold similar to the one of the Hurricane, which would have allowed a 15 kph speed gain, the Nieuport 161 could reach at least 510 kph (with a HS 12 Y delivering only 860 hp).

With a Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 29 - delivering a 60 Hp excess of power 450 m higher - and combined with a rearward exhaust manifold, she could exceed a top speed of more than 530 kph at 5,000 m.

Such a performance would be similar to that of the Dewoitine D.520 fighter, with better maneuverability and climb performances (but a less comfortable range and a slightly lighter armament). 

The available data on the D 520 (167 kg/m²) and the Nieuport 161 suggest also the Ni 161 was  the better in tight turns.

Moreover, the Nieuport fighter could have allowed a better mood to all Allied actors during the first year of the WWII.

From all these reasons, I think the choice of a clearly bad fighter (the MS 406, which was not a bad aircraft, just a good, powerful and armed school-plane...) contributed clearly to the Allied and French defeat.