From the Battle of Verdun, 1916, to the present 21th Century, fighters are the key of any battlefield :
- First, they establish their mastering in all flight space above the troops of their own country (especially during an offensive phase);
- Second, they will obtain the same achievement above the battlefield (this may be a bit more difficult);
- Lastly, the two preceding steps being achieved, they may establish their domination beyond enemy lines to facilitate as much as possible any Allied strike against the enemy.
These three steps impose to respect some conditions :
- To have a sufficient amount of fighter pilots able to face all possible situations (not very simple at all).
- These fighters pilots must satisfy a lot of requests allowing them to annihilate quickly as much as possible enemy aircrafts:
- They must be fast enough to catch these aircrafts.
- They must climb fast enough (at any altitude) to prohibit discovery (or bombing) by enemy recce aircrafts of any friendly military structure.
- If the fight was badly started (or being hampered by a simple lack of ammunition), these fighters have to allow a well trained pilot to escape and to return to his airbase.
At last, an efficient warning system must allow our fighter pilots to take off as quickly as possible and to be positioned in the best tactical situation for attacking enemies (i.e. at a higher altitude than enemy aircrafts).}
Brief inventorie of Morane equipped French Fighters groups the 10 of May, 1940 at 0400
At this very moment, the Armée de l'Air's Great Staff was really aware of the above principles.
But it had lost his illusions about the Morane-Saulnier 406, so-called "the best fighter in the World" by some French politicians (Pierre Cot) as by his "think tank" of the CEMA, that influenced him a lot.
The operational experiments of November 1938, during which MS 406 was completely defeated by older fighters (of 1932), resulted only in the exile of GC I/7 in Syria (where nobody was a threat for our flag).
Nobody dared to question the mass production of this fighter...
Few months later, tactical difficulties of Morane fighter were again detected during mock combats between her and the Curtiss H 75.
During the Phoney War, fighting between Morane 406 and Messerschmitt Bf 109, confirmed the worried situation of Armée de l'Air.
Now, we know Morane's pilots complained very early about the performances of this fighter.
In January 1940, the development of the Bloch 152 was just completed.
Bloch fighters that just left factories were still not all up to date.
Most of them were fitted with the old and totally inefficient motor cowling and lacked the rearward exhaust pipes:Their top speed at altitude was limited to 482 kph, instead of 510 kph.
So, they were performing as it is said (falsely) about the Morane 406 but with almost twice the firepower.
Similarly, the Dewoitine 520, whose development was fairly completed in February 1939, achieved a top speed of 527 kph and a climbing time to 8,000 m of 13'45'' with her Hispano 12 Y 29 engine.
She was never mass produced as is, despite it could be already effective in June 1939.
The too cleaver deciders, in their magnificent Air Ministry palace, preferred another engine, the Hispano 12 Y 45 fitted with the - really - excellent Szydlowski-Planiol supercharger, which allowed an increase of the critical altitude by 1,500 to 2,000 m.
They expected a better speed (560 kph) at circa 6,000 m.
But, as you know, the devil is in the details, details completely overlooked by these deciders.
The new engine being longer than the preceding one, so the modified new variant of the D 520 needed to be lengthened, increasing the normal take-off weight from 2,530 kg to 2,750 kg.
The new variant had some advantages: She had a better fire power, she had a 600 km longer ferry range, due to unprotected new wing tanks (which needed to be totally empty before any attempt of aerobatics).
Nevertheless, the first mass produced Dewoitine, which was the new variant, appeared only in November 1939, and all the perfecting had to be done again.
So, the first operational sorties occurred only after the May 12, 1940: Very, very late, isn't it?
A 4 steps lesson
{The data I used here came from the excellent book of MM. Comas et al., Le Morane-Saulnier 406, Lela Presse, in French}
Fortunately, during the Phoney War, aerial French losses were not very dramatic.
May be, either the German pilots were insufficiently trained (that being not very likely), or the Luftwaffe want to make the French asleep.
As seen by fighter pilots, the following Campaign of France might be organized in 4 steps imposed by the Reich.
I - From May 10 to 13 , the German Jagdwaffe flew almost exclusively above both the Netherlands and Belgium. The aim was to persuade Allied deciders that the future military operations would be very similar to the August-September 1914 ones. This deception strategy was highly successful.
II - From May 14 to 22, the Luftwaffe protected the famous Guderian offensive. That was accompanied by a systematic bombing of the French airfields (not too far from the German lines).
III - From the May 23 to the June 2, the Luftwaffe attacked mainly several important components of the Dunkirk-Lille pocket, the main goal being to destroy in one unique strike all the Belgian, British and French armies and almost all their equipment.
Most of this effort was used to destroy military vessels or transport boats (with their excellent Ju 87 Stuka), the remaining effort being used to destroy methodically the fortified positions and heavy weapons used by the surviving French soldiers to allow evacuation of Allied troops.
IV - From the June 3 to June 24, the Luftwaffe was very active to support the current offensives. Once Paris declared "open city" (June 11, 1940) and the major transfer of the French military aircrafts beyond the Mediterranean Sea (since May 16) favored obviously all tasks of Wehrmacht and of Luftwaffe.
Step one:
The Armée de l'Air staff placed its fighter squadrons in an astonishingly complex geography.
The position of Curtiss H 75 equipped squadrons (in the North of Paris) may signify they were seen, then, as their best fighters (before the arrival of the D 520).
The Jagdwaffe, already involved on attacks over Belgium and the Netherlands, had not a sufficient amount of fighters to escort all German bombers attacking France's airfields.
Doing so, it reinforced the credibility of the hypothesis that German Staff would reuse the famous Schlieffen plan without modifications.
The 10 of May, most of German bombers were unescorted. Nevertheless, during all their flight over France, they were perfectly guided by their radio-electronic means.
Seven Morane equipped groups (each with 2 squadrons) gathered a significant part of French aerial defense:
- GC III/1, at Norrent-Fontes (62), the best of all Morane-Saulnier equipped GC (fighter groups) downed 8 bombers for the loss of one fighter (pilot WIA).
- GC I/2, at Toul-Ochey (54), won 4 victories (among them 1 Bf 109 E), without loss.
- GC II/7, at Wez-Thuisy (51), won 4 victories against the loss of 2 fighters facing several Bf 110, but, also, 9 more by bombing on their airfield.
- GC III/2, at Cambrai-Niergnies (59), won 3 victories but had lost 4 Morane in combat and 10 more by bombing on their airfield.
- GC III/7, at Vitry-le-François (51), won 2 victories, had lost 1 Morane in combat, but 3 more by bombing on their airfield.
- GC II/2, at Laon-Chambry (02), won 2 victoires but had lost 1 MS 406.
- GC III/6, at Chissey (39), won 2 victories but had lost 2 Morane.
GC III/3 and GC I/6 (as, obviously, GC I/7), experienced no victory and no loss, only because they were ill positioned against the German offensive:
- GC III/3 was at Beauvais (60). In the evening the May10, it was dispatched to Maubeuge (59).
- A "super strategist" dispatched the GC I/6 near Marseille (13) to reinforce the defense against Italy, which was not so enthusiast to enter war! {I have no information explaining why that unit was not at war until the 18 of May}
- GC I/7 was at Rayak (Syria), punished because it failed to demonstrate, at Fall 1938, the MS 406 was the best fighter in the World!
- In the contrary, it had demonstrated the Morane was completely outclassed by the Spad 510 and the Dewoitine D 510 of the previous contest!!!.
First day
Nevertheless, the 7 MS 406 GC present at the May 10, 1940, totalled about 170 fighters, a not negligible force.
Despite these 7 units benefited of the best possible conditions, they achieved only 25 victories, which signify that only 3.57 enemy plane was downed by each squadron.
These success were counterbalanced by 11 MS 406 lost in combat. Moreover, 22 Morane were lost in airfield bombings.
So a total of 33 Morane disappeared in only one day! One fifth of the total amount...
If the three absent groups (circa 72 MS 406) could have participate in the battle, they could add about 15 more victories and, may be, reduced the losses ratio in flight and on the ground.
Obviously, pilots of Morane fighters, despite their excellent aerobatic capacities and their courage, suffered a lot.
The French generals leading the largest fighters units were aware of this problem and knew very well the serious disadvantages induced by the choice of Morane-Saulnier 406.
That may explain why they chosen the very amazing solution of escorting Morane 406 fighters squadrons by other kind of fighter planes.
Escort missions (Step II)
These missions were assigned to Curtiss H 75 or MB 152 or Dewoitine 520 GCs, all these fighters being more performing and reliable than MS 406.
1 - 14 of Mai, the first of such mission was decided to protect 7 MS 406 of GC III/7 which protected Sedan-Flize sector. They were protected by Dewoitine 520.
The MS 406 downed 4 Hs 126 and Adj. Albert Littolff became the first French ace flying a Morane.
At the same time, D 520 downed several Bf 109. No loss: The morale of French pilots had greatly improved.
Such morale may explain the real success of the following mission (at 1730, the same day) in which 9 Morane escorted 14 Amiot 143 bombers of Cdt de Laubier over Sedan.
These fighters stood up during 30 minutes to 12 Messerschmitt 109 E flying 2,000 m above them!
In the literature, this mission is universally described as a suicide...
But the real losses were two bombers, crippled by AA fire, crashed on the ground with 3 KIA and 2 POW for their 2 crews. Another bomber, unable to flew further away, emergency landed during her return flight.
The remaining eleven bombers returned to their airbases, more or less damaged but still airworthy.
These losses have essentially to be related to the very low specified bombing altitude of 750 meters AGL.
This had nothing to do with the real suicide missions of the Fairey Battle launched without fighter escort by the RAF since the first day of the German offensive.
The loss of 3 bombers among 14 (21.5 %), may be seen more as a rather defensive French success.
2 - 16 of May, 9 Bloch MB 152 protected 6 Morane of GC II/2. No casualties: Success.
3 - 17 of May, 6 Dewoitine 520 of GC I/3 protected 9 MS 406 of GC II/2. No German fighter but the Flak damaged some fighters: Mixed Success.
4 - 21 of May, 24 MS 406 belonging to GC III/7 and GC III/1 were used to cover troops disembarking from trains at Montdidier (Somme), were themselves protected by 9 MB 152.
The attack of Bf 109 was tragic for GC III/7 (4 Morane downed, Lt Dyma KIA).
Adjutant Edgar Gagnaire (GC III/1) downed a Bf 109: Serious failure.
5 - The same day, 18 Morane of GC III/6 covering the Cambrai-Bapaume sector were protected by 9 Dewoitine 520 of GC I/3.
Clouds being too numerous at 2 000 m, the low altitude patrol flew half-an-hour under the cloud, so Flak gave it to its heart: 4 Morane fighters were badly damaged, one pilot WIA.
Six Bf 109 and 3 Bf 110 dived on the remaining fighters. Three Morane were downed, one pilot POW, one other KIA.
Apparently, the other patrols were not aware of the drama: Very serious failure.
6 - 24 of May, 9 MS 406 of GC III/3 and 9 other of GC III/6 were gathered to destroy enemy bombers. Nine Dewoitine 520 of GC II/3 protected them.
A German formation of 20 Dornier 17 was attacked by all French fighters, including the escorting Dewoitine (!), but 12 Messerschmitt 110 counterattacked.
Toll was disastrous: 3 Morane were downed and 2 pilots KIA at GC III/3, group captain Castanier was KIA and one pilot was POW at GC III/6, for only 3 victories - one Bf 110 downed by Captain Duval (GC III/3) and two Do 17 for Adj. Japiot (GC III/6).
The Dewoitine downed two Do 17 (one not confirmed): Very serious failure.
7 - 26 of May, 12 MS 406 escorted two Potez 63-11. They were protected by 6 Curtiss of GC I/4.
All were attacked by, at least, a dozen of Messerschmitt 109. Curtiss downed four Bf 109 at the cost of 3 of their own.
Pilots of Morane won 8 victories but they lost two fighters and two pilots were POW : Mixed Success.
8 - 27 of May, 9 Morane of GC III/3 protected 2 Potez 63-11 of recce. They were protected by 9 Bloch 152 of GC GC I/8. 2 Bloch were lost: Mixed Success.
9 - 30 of Mai, 9 MS 406 of the II/7 were covering from 1715 to 1900 above Abbeville. They were protected by several Bloch 152 of GC I/8 and D 520 du GC I/3.
Two Morane were damaged by Flak fire but no loss: Mixed Success.
Step III
10 - 3 of June, Nine Morane of GC III/7 took off after-noon to attack 20 Heinkel 111 involved in the Paula operation (= bombing of aeronautic sites near Paris) which were returning home.
One He 111 was downed by Littolff and Martin.
Ten Bf 109 counterattacked. Adjutant Martin, WIA, must land his MS 406 in emergency.
Four Dewoitine 520 of GC I/3 arrived to save the remaining MS 406. Mixed Success.
11 - 6 of June, five MS 406 of GC III/7 were protecting a mixed unit of Bréguet 693 and LéO 451.
They were protected by D 520 belonging to GC I/3 and GC II/7.
A formation of Bf 109 attacked the Morane. Cdt Maurice Arnoux, a famous ace of the WW I, had his fighter badly damaged, in fire, crashed. Very serious failure.
12 - 8 of June, 8 Morane in combat air patrol, flying South of the Rouen-Amiens line , protected by Dewoitine 520.
The Morane, diving from the Sun, attacked by surprise 9 Messerschmitt 109 E.
Captain Williame downed a Bf 109 with S/Lt Audebert and S/Lt Chalupa. In stride, Williame - alone - downed also 2 other Bf 109, becoming an ace. Success!
13 - The same day, at the end of the day, 9 MS 406 of the same GC, escorted by D 520 of GC II/3 and Bloch 152 of GC II/6, while flying to Soissons, they surprise a Ju 87 Stuka formation at 1945.
Six Ju 87 Stuka were downed, among them 3 by Williame (one with Lt Monty).
Two Morane were destroyed and the excellent Lt Monty was KIA. The other pilot was unhurt. Mixed Success.
Outcome of the escort missions, seen from Morane GC side
Among the 13 escort missions previously described, six may be seen as success, seven are not successful (or worth).
Such results seem not be correlated to the kind of the escorting fighter used, but to training, debriefing, even to the escort pilots themselves.
During 2 missions, two kind of escort fighters (Dewoitine 520 and MB 152) were mixed.
It signified that 3 different fighters coexisted in the same space of fighting, inducing a difficult coordination of the maneuvers, especially when such conditions were never experienced before.
Outcome of the escort missions, seen from escort fighters side
Overall, the results are not very convincing.
Some losses of the escorted MS 406 may be explained by an insufficient training of the escort pilots to such task.
Another reason is a rather ineffective use of the radio.
Some times, the radio traffic was lacking in brevity, preventing vital informations from reaching the interested pilots: Likely, that caused the loss of Cdt Maurice Arnoux.
Worth, some times, the escort fighters suffered losses.
It might be correlated to the pilots used to fly rather close to the bombers they were escorting.
Such a behavior meets generally the wishes of the escorted crews (A. Galland, Die Ersten und die Letzten, in French translation).
Nevertheless, in a battle airspace, the fighter planes must absolutely remain as Elusive Flying Object (EFO).
Obviously, since their flight maneuver were centered around a small area, even if this center was mobile, its movements becomes predictable and, for any attacker, escort fighters become preys as well as all escorted aircrafts.
Moreover, numerous losses cause a lower morale in all units.
However, the idea of escorted fighters was also used during the Summer 1940 by British deciders (Battle of Britain), the Hurricane attacking the German bombers while Spitfire counterattacked the Messerschmitt.
What to do with MS 406 ?
In Februay 2012, I wrote the outdated military aircrafts might not be wasted because they remain deadly. One just have to learn how to use them efficiently.
Morane 406 were very inefficient fighters, but they were still usable.
The decision to escort them demonstrated clearly that MS 406 lacked performances for fighting other fighters, as also, using such fighters as ground support aircrafts like it was decided by general Romatet, a bit later, were two heartbreaking examples of misuse of such aircrafts.
Some more profitable actions would have been done:
a) Complaints from pilots, at the Fall of 1939, about Morane's performances had not been immediately fixed.
However, it was easy to fix that shortcomings of the Morane fighter: Ordering a new and better designed liquid radiator and 12 rearward exhaust pipes would have ensured her the famous top speed of 480 kph and the engine would run at lower temperature, allowing a very better efficiency.
This task might been achieved in, at most, one month.
Instead, as often in France, some committees have been convened. The deciders ordered to change also the wings and to replace the two drum-fed machine guns by four belt-fed machine guns.
So, only a handful of Morane 410 were produced for the end of May 1940, nine months too late.
b) Young pilots of French Air Force used Morane 317 or Morane 230 when they were at their perfecting stage. So, before they became true military pilots, they never flew faster than 210 kph, a bit more than the landing speed of their future fighters...
It was necessary to train these pilots with very faster transition aircrafts. The Morane 406 could have completed such a task.
c) Moreover, it was easy to position all the Morane fighters 200 km further from the front, a location where no Messerschmitt 109 could stay in flight. So, the German bombers would suffer, without fighter support, from about French 240 fighters.
So, we might obtain better trained fighter pilots.
The Escort Concept
The purpose of fighter escort is annihilation of any enemy fighters.
1 - In 1916, there was no escort at all: An as great amount of fighters are sent to eliminate any enemy threat in one given sector of the front. This simple method seemed appropriate for a rather small battle space (i.e. the Verdun Battle).
2 - Two years later, there were powerful aircrafts, like the twin engined Caudron R 11, with 5 machine-guns each, to repel attackers.
They introduced the notion of flying anti-aircrafts battery, which gave, 20 years later, the French SE 100 and the US Boeing B 40.
Such a choice was, then, a total failure, the new weapons (0.5 cal. MG or canons) being too heavy, adding too much drag and inducing a too heavy charge of ammunition (6,000 kg for the B 40!).
3 - The fighter planes accompanying the bombers. The image of that from the Hollywood films (the fighters flying at some dozen of feets from the escorted bombers) is totally misleading.
However, as said by A. Galland, the best results of the Jagdwaffe were achieved when a strong fighter formation was sent ahead of the bombers units to wipe out all enemy aircrafts flying in the sector to be bombed.
Moreover, additional fighters would be welcomed to annihilate all surviving enemy aircraft.
In all cases, it's necessary to have a lot of fighters!
Obviously (and logically), the base of efficiency in any Fighter Command is the choice of a relevant fighter, a choice always directed by her capabilities to eliminate any military enemy aircraft.
The Morane 406 never demonstrated such capabilities; However, the Nieuport 161 had all of them.
4 - Germans had a very efficient method against France, Belgium and the Netherlands, devoid of radar system: They favored systematically attacks of the Airbases occurring just before the Sunset.
If all Allies acted quickly in imitation of enemies (following the principle: All action efficient against us may be also efficient against the enemy), the Luftwaffe might have lost a part of its harmfulness.
Instead, we used our bombers for psychological actions (leaflets dropping) which were inaudible for populations saturated with the Dr. Goebbels propaganda. .
5 - Actions against the anti-armoured convoys were not impossible: It was daily used on the Russian front (Roger Sauvage, Un du Normandie-Niemen, in French).
Unfortunately, as conceived by Gal. Romatet in 1940, they were very costly in pilot losses induced by the stupid will to make two passes on the targets.
Otherwise, one might had advantage to use Bloch 151 or 152, tougher than MS 406 and more nimble than the Bréguet 693...
Conclusion
The German chosen, en 1936, the very advanced Messerschmitt 109, efficient and easy to upgrade.
The United Kindom, at the same times, fully trusted to several poor military aircrafts, to put it mildly:
- The Defiant, too heavy and devoid of any forward firing armament,
- the Gladiator, too slow but very nimble,
- the Hurricane, slow and using only light machine-guns,
- the Blenheim, very slow and carrying a too light bomb load,
- the Whitley very slow but able to carry a significant bomb load.
Fortunately, in the medium term, the RAF could count on the Spitfire fighters as fast than was the Messerschmitt 109 but more maneuverable.
The Armée de l'Air, as also the French Air ministry, ordered an especially poor fighter, very time consuming to build and structurally outdated (= unsuited to obtain performing descendants). In war operations, the Morane fighter was not able to achieve most of the standard fighter missions.
The losses of MS 406 appeared significant even at the very beginning of the German offensive, even when facing not escorted German bombers.
After the battle, some group leaders blamed their pilots to be insufficiently trained in aerobatics! The German fighter pilots seemed not sharing such a judgment.
Some generals of the Armée de l'Air (I do not know their names), showing concern for their pilots, tried the solution of the escort of fighters without achieving great success.
In facts, these generals inflicted a scathing denial on CEMA engineers: They re-assessed this "fighter" as a bomber devoid of bombs. So, the CEMA had completely failed!
I really doubt that they would have the same problem if the French Air Ministry had chosen the Nieuport 161 fighter, but you already knew that!
{From the other hand, the US weekly Defense News published, the 28 of May 2020, The F 22 imperative, a paper from MM Deptula & Birkey.
After the crash of a F 22 Raptor, the 15 of Mai 2020, they highlight risks of attrition of the F 22 force in the military arsenal of USA.
The authors recall :
- The F-35 was designed mainly for ground attack.
- "While the F-16 and F-15 will remain an important part of the inventory out of necessity, their operational utility will diminish given they do not address the challenges that will increasingly dominate the security environment."
- "Future next generation air dominance concepts must also proceed. However, COVID-19-related budget pressures are likely going to delay meaningful advancement in this regard. "
So, the F 22 Raptor fighter is the only key to secure US air superiority everywhere.
"Canceling the F-22’s production with half the military requirement unmet was a tragedy whose impact will be felt for years."
The only "cost-effective way to reinforce this force is to upgrade the 33 older block 20 F-22s (...) to full combat capability".
"For those who focus on cost, are they prepared to pay the price of not having the entire F-22 force at its peak potential? That bill would be measured in strategic objectives surrendered, significant force attrition, and lives lost."
In other words, flying without a top cover of F 22 would be very dangerous for F 35 at war...}
