The Japanese Zero fighter was one of the most brilliant jewels of the Imperial Navy from 1940 to 1943.
For the Allied, she appeared terrific during at least two years.
At the very end of the Pacific War, the same people who had been terrified previously, were joking about her : This aircraft disappeared from the air because she is now unable to fight our marvelous new fighters Hellcat, Corsair, Mustang and Spitfire.
At the end of 1938, very few were the countries able to use of aircraft carriers (USA, United Kingdom, Japan and France).
Most of them used only of biplane fighters. E.g. the US Navy had the Grumman F2F (372 kph) and F3F (425 kph).
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| Grumman F3F1 : the engine was 1.38 m in diameter, delivered 950 hp, the fuselage was short (7 m), the wing area totaled 24 m². Despite a lethal crash after only 10 days of flight testings, a flat spin induced the loss of the second prototype (without injury for the pilot). This fighter was produced and inspirited the F4F Wildcat. |
The Fleet Air Arm, in the best case, used of the Sea Gladiator (395 kph), in the other cases, it used the Blackburn Skua, a good dive bomber with a top speed of
Nothing about the Kriegsmarine because the Graf Zepplin carrier would be certainly able to carry the modern Bf 109 T as, also, the terrific Junkers 87 Stuka dive bomber. She never achieved the last steps of her development, even she was already afloat in 1938.
Hermann Goering refused to give aircrafts for "that"...
The French Navy was never interested by the biplane fighters, except at its very debuts (Hanriot HD1 / HD2). May be that was only to appear more advanced than the others navies...
The last parasol fighters (Dewoitine D. 373), were claimed fast (405 kph), but they never exceed 380 kph.
However, with the Mitsubishi A5M, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the first Navy to may use of low wing monoplane fighters.
The A5M was 7.57 m long, weighted 1 220 kg empty and 1 670 kg at take off.
The wingspan was 11 m and the wing area totaled 17.8 m² giving a wing loading of 94 kg/m².
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| A5M - The 785 hp engine was 1.28 m in diameter (0.13 m larger than the engine of the Zero. |
Achieving 440 kph, climbing to 3 000 m in 3' 35" and having an exceptional maneuverability, she triggered the obsolescence of all the on-board biplane fighters.
The Imperial Japanese Army top staff manipulated very easily the rulers of its country.
Its deciders seemed to imagine for themselves a planetary role. But the following events demonstrated they did not have a true knowledge in the geography of the coveted regions nor in their adversaries.
This heralded tomorrow who are disillusioning.
The Imperial Navy, feeling the coming crisis, was to prepare its future playground: The Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and all the connexions between them. About the third of the Earth area...
At the beginning
Since the 1921 experiments of Billy Mitchell, each people sharing some common sense knew the battleships were simultaneously excessively expensive and, also, quite inefficient.
In December 1941, the US Navy go to war with the 7 following aircraft carriers.
- Lexington (CV-2 1927) - 37 000 tons and 90 aircrafts
- Saratoga (CV-3 1927) - 37 000 tons and 90 aircrafts
- Ranger (CV-4 1934) - 15 000 tons and 60 aircrafts
- Yorktown(CV-5 1937) - 20 000 tons and 70 aircrafts
- Enterprise(CV-6 1938) - 20 000 tons and 70 aircrafts
- Wasp(CV-7 1940) - 15 000 tons and 60 aircrafts
- Hornet(CV-8 1941) - 20 000 tons and 70 aircrafts
I omitted the Langley (CV-1) she was only used as a lorry transporting essentially aircrafts in crates.
Most of the american dive-bombers were the very inefficient Chance-Vought SB2U Vindicators (known in France as the Chance-Vought 156) which seemed designed only to give victories to the Axis pilots.
The Douglas torpedo-bombers TBD Devastators, even rather slow (335 km/h) and not very maneuverable, were able to sink enemy merchant boats as also the aircraft-carrier Shôhô.
The best, these US carriers were able to create an aerial attaque force gathering 500 aircrafts.
Some stay in the Atlantic Ocean, but the Panama Canal was firmly held by USA, reducing the chances of a blocking of their fleets. So, they might transfert at will their aircraft-carriers from one ocean to the other (it's no more possible today, taking into account the too large size of the nuclear carriers).
Most of the american dive-bombers were the very inefficient Chance-Vought SB2U Vindicators (known in France as the Chance-Vought 156) which seemed designed only to give victories to the Axis pilots.
The Douglas torpedo-bombers TBD Devastators, even rather slow (335 km/h) and not very maneuverable, were able to sink enemy merchant boats as also the aircraft-carrier Shôhô.
The best, these US carriers were able to create an aerial attaque force gathering 500 aircrafts.
Some stay in the Atlantic Ocean, but the Panama Canal was firmly held by USA, reducing the chances of a blocking of their fleets. So, they might transfert at will their aircraft-carriers from one ocean to the other (it's no more possible today, taking into account the too large size of the nuclear carriers).
The Imperial Japanese Navy obtained, in the Washington agreement (1921), the third rank in the World, equal to the sum of the French and Italian Navy.
The December 6, 1941, it gathered 11 carriers :
- Ryūjō (1931) - 10 500 tons and 45 aircrafts
- Sōryū (1935) - 16 000 tons and 60 aircrafts
- Hiryū (1937) - 17 500 tons and 60 aircrafts
- Kaiyō (1938) - 13 500 tons and 24 aircrafts
- Shōkaku (1939) - 26 000 tons and 70 aircrafts
- Zuikaku (1939) - 26 000 tons and 70 aircrafts
- Zuihō (1940) - 11 500 tons and 30 aircrafts
- Shōhō (1941) - 11 500 tons and 30 aircrafts .
Most of them (circa 80%) were either Aichi D3A (Val for the US) dive bombers able to fly up to 390 kph or torpedo-bombers Nakajima B5N (Kate for the US) which had a top speed of 380 kph.
It's must be added a large amount of float planes carried by heavy cruisers, by submarines and by seaplanes tenders.
Most of them were dedicated to recce flights.
Most of them were dedicated to recce flights.
The October 5, 1937, the high staff of the Imperial Navy published, for the Zaïbatsu (=Japanese trusts) Nakajima and Mitsubishi, a program gathering its needs for a new on-board fighter which was to be powered by an actual running engine.
This last point, as also the very hard level of the specifications, demonstrated the Empire of the Rising Sun was about to go to war with the Allies.
This last point, as also the very hard level of the specifications, demonstrated the Empire of the Rising Sun was about to go to war with the Allies.
- The top speed must achieve 500 kph at 4,000 m.
- Climbing to 6, 000 m in less than 9' 30".
- The total range must be 2 hours at full speed (=1 ,000 km) and from 6 to 8 hours at the economical cruising speed
- Two 20 mm cannons and two 7.7 mm machine guns were needed.
- The flying qualities and the maneuverability were to be equal to those of the previous A5M.
- A very complete radio equipment must be found in each fighter, including a goniometric receiver.
But Jiro Horikoshi, chief of the design staff in Mitsubishi, accepted the challenge. He was helped by a special alloy combining magnésium and aluminium found by the Sumitomo industrial group (this alloy implied special protections against corrosion).
The Mitsubishi Zuisei engine was chosen for the first prototype, because its low weight.
Il delivered 780 hp in altitude, allowing to reach the specified 500 kph speed.
Nevertheless, the climbing times being only average, it was substituted by the Nakajima Sakae engine delivering 925 to 940 hp and allowing performances well above the expectations.
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Mitsubishi A6M2b - A very streamlined fighter. |
The A6M2b Zero in December 1941
The fuselage was 9.05 m long.She weighted 1,754 kg empty and 2,421 kg for take off (normal payload = 665 kg).
Overloaded (drop tank + two 60 kg bombs), the Zero took off at 2,800 kg.
The wingspan was 12 m and the wing area totaled 22.44 m², quite identical to the one of the Spitfire Mk I (22.48 m²) that was 204 kg heavier.
The relative thickness of the foil varied from 15% at the roots 9 at the extremity.
The aspect ratio was 6.42 (5.61 for the Spitfire Mk I), an help to the obtention of good performances.
The wing loading was 108 kg/m² allowed her the extraordinary turning capability which established her an unparalleled reputation until today.
Overloaded (max fuel+ max bombs), the wing loading don't exceed 125 kg/m².
The armament gathered two 20 mm cannons (60 shell each) and two 7.7 mm machine guns (700 cartridges each).
However, the chosen cannons (Oerlikon 20 mm FF F) were picked for their low weight (24 kg each). So, they had a muzzle velocity of only 600 mps, implying non optimal ballistic properties.
One may add two 30 kg bombs or, better, two 60 kg bombs, lethal for any destroyer and dangerous even for an cruiser!
The Nakajima Sakae 14 cylinders engine delivered 940 hp at 4,200 m.
Weighting circa 530 kg, having a diameter of only 1.15 m, it had a frontal area of only 1.039 m² which, associated with a well streamlined cowling, explained the good performances and the maneuverability of the Zero.
The fighter displayed excellent performances :
- The top speed was 535 kph at 4,700 m, similar to that of the French Dewoitine D 520 fighter in May-June 1940. That speed was also similar to that of the P 40 furnished to the British as the Kittyhawk I for the June 3, 1942, which climbed to 6,000 m in a deplorable time comprised between 14 and 17 minutes!
- She climbed to 6,000 m in 7' 27" (for the same altitude, the time was 7' 47" for the Nieuport 161 of 1936 but the N 161-03, at the end of 1938, climbed in 7' 03"). Anyway, the Zero outclassed completely the Kittyhawk I as, also, many other Allied fighters.
- The VNE of the A6M2 was 630 kph, 70 kph faster than the Curtis H 75 of the l'Armée de l'Air in May 1940.
- The total range on the intern fuel only was 2,222 km. With the addition of a 333 liters drop tank, the total range was 3,350 km.
- The combat radius, clean, exceeded 700 km if a 30 minutes combat was needed. One may conclude that such capabilities, six times better than those of the Bf 109 astray somewhere in the sky of England, constituted the key of many surprises!
- The structure of the Japanese fighter implied the wings were assembled in one unique part, helping to obtain a low weight together than a good strength. So, the maneuverability and the performances were favored. However, the construction of the Zero fighter was more time consuming.
Flying qualities
An US report of 1943 gave us some useful informations.
The cockpit was described as really easy to use.
Instruments were easy to read, but the flight stick was positioned forward a little too much, inducing contacts with the dashboard.
The pilot visibility was seen as excellent, contrasting with memories of a ancient Japanese pilot which lamented about the too fast yellowing of the cockpit canopy Plexiglas.
During the at the beginning of the take off, the fighter was not easy to keep rolling straight until circa 40 kph, owing to the erratic action of the brakes.
Above this speed, the ruder became perfectly sufficient to control the direction.
Once, however, the fighter had done a severe swing to the left. The recovery was made by using a full last of the throttle and full right ruder.
The Zero responded instantly and take off once the direction control was regained.
The take off was obtained at 120 kph. The optimal climb speed was 140 kph IAS.
The angle of climb was very steep and the excellent zoom rate of climb was the best asset of this fighter.
Up to 500 kph (which see), the Zero was easy to fly, she responded readily to changes in the controls. Faster, the pilot needed both hands to perform a slow barrel.
The Zero was much less stable in flight than the heavier US fighter, nevertheless, this lack of stability was nullified by the extreme ease of handling.
The stall occurred at 105 kph clean and at 93 kph with flaps and landing gears extended.
The fighter gave ample warnings (by slight buffeting in the elevators and vibrations in the fuselage) before the occurrence of the stall. In all cases, recovery was rapid and straight.
All aerobatics were easy to perform, and were obtained "with a natural grace, characteristic of the good fighter planes".
In particular, loops and immelmans might be performed at indicated speeds as low as 260 kph.
At the cruising speed, in level flight, it was possible to carry out consecutive loops without losing altitude.
The turning radius was very short (the French ace Pierre Clostermann, in his book Feux du Ciel, gave a time 10 to 11 seconds for a 360° turn at cruising speed). The roll rate was fast under 400 kph.
The landing speed was 135 kph (clean), and, with all extended, the Zero was easy to land at 110 kph.
Some words of the most famous Australian ace on the Zero
Clive "Killer" Caldwell wrote in 1943 (see picture below) that the loss of maneuverability of the Zero appeared at 560 kph (350 mph).
According to the exceptional technical and military qualities of this pilot, I'm retaining his opinion.
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| Les conseils de C. K. Caldwell aux pilotes Alliés - Le Zéro restait manœuvrant jusqu'à 560 km/h ! Personne n'en voudra à ce pilote de préférer le Spitfire, là on est dans le pure domaine de l'affectif. |
Pierre Clostermann, in his book Feux du Ciel (Flammarion, 1951, in French) wrote one of his teammate in 1945, the Australian pilot Bay Adams, reported him a combat he had supported the July 6, 1943 with the RAAF in the sky of Darwin, Australia.
A Japanese raid of 27 bombers escorted by 21 Zeros was intercepted by 24 Spitfire which already attacked the bombers, downing about ten of them.
Already, they were attacked by the escorting Zeros.
Bay Adams launched the charge at 500 kph behind a Zero which flew gently downhill and open the fire.
Already, the Zero performed a perfect loop with a radius of 200 m, being in the six hours of Adams.
The Australian pilot, flabbergasted, had instinctive reflex to dive vertically from 7 000 m up to the sea level, saving his precious life.
This day, 2 Zeros were downed at the cost of 7 Spitfire!
The A6M2-N (Rufe in the US), the "too late" spin off floatplane fighter
OK, a seaplane may took off (or land) theoretically from any water area.
Such hydro-bases are, obviously, immune to any form of bombing and, moreover, because, in the entire Pacific zone, there are a huge quantity of islands with a lagoon.
Each lagoon constitute, potentially, both a landing runway as a take off one where the water waves are ever lower than those of the surrounding ocean.
The expected future seaplane fighter, the Kawanishi Kyofu appeared not easy to perfect, may be due to some too much sophisticated equipment, as, e.g. the contra-rotative propellers.
The thundering success of the Zero fighter in China induced in some officers of the IJN the idea that a temporary but quite instantaneous solution lay in the adaptation of floats to this fighter.
This work was given to Nakajima, from a plane of the first series (A6 M11). The engineers chosen the most marine solution, with only one central float (at the cost of circa 20 kph).
The armament was the same than the one used on the Zeros that attacked Pearl Harbor: Two FF F 20 mm cannons and two riffle caliber machine-guns (and, eventually, two 60 kg bombs).
The prototype of this crash program took off for her maiden flight the Decembre 7, 1941.
This fighter was excellent, the rudder have been enlarged, with also the addition of a little under it.
The length of this fighter was 10.24 m because the central float exceeded the air-screw.
The wing area was conserved at 22.438 m² despite an empty weight increased from 1,750 to 1,920 kg. The take off weight was 2,460 kg.
The wing loading was 110 kg.
The top speed was 437 kph at 4,300 m, the total range was 1,150 km at the cruising speed of 300 kph.
The climb to 5,000 m was done in 6' 49" (to be compared to the 4' 30" for 3,000 m and the circa 10' for 6,000 m of a Wildcat with a 1,200 hp engine - source : Ital. Wikipedia - ).
The service ceiling was 10,000 m.
The stall speed was 111 km/h.
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| A6 M11-N - A modified by me from this site. |
This excellent seaplane was mass produced in 327 exemples, an exceptional amount for a seaplane fighter of WW II.
They entered service in June 1942 (six months too late for Japan).
They were used as interceptors, as recce planes and also to harass the American little patrolers (as the PT 109 of JFK) which attacked the Japanese merchant ships refueling the soldiers.
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| Eight A6 M2-N about to fly a CAP |
They appeared as good fighters, including against flying fortress (B 17 or B 24)!
Flying usually in patrol of three planes, they were fearless against the powerful Beaufighter, despite it was 80 kph faster than the Rufe (but more clumsy): See the excellent book of Bernard Baëza, Soleil Levant sur l'Australie, Lela Presse (in French).
In the islands where they were assigned, they had few chance to encounter enemy terrestrial fighters that had not a sufficient range.
So, they do their jobs during all the war. As scout planes, they outclassed the usual aircrafts of the fleet in speed and in agility, which gave them a better survival rate.
We can be surprised these floatplanes fighters had not been used in the systematic escort of the Japanese convoy of merchant ships.
However, such an use was likely to much expensive in fuel supplies. From the other hand, we know how flying seaplanes are reserved to very few excellent pilots...
At the last part of the Pacific War, the Rufe were based in lakes inside Japan. Nevertheless, some of them dared to attack B 29 bombers!!!
About the Zero evolution
As all the well conceived fighters, the A6M2 was modified to take into account the arrival of new enemy fighters.
The very famous Spitfire Mk V appeared not as a problem for her during the first encounters in the Australian sky as late as 1943.
One must recall the British fighter was slowed by her huge and unsightly Vokes sand filter. Simultaneously, she became heavier: She was not so fast and not so agile than in the European skies.
Moreover, in the RAAF, the high ranking officers had no combat experience in the modern war, but some the younger pilots had already survived combats against the Axis in North Africa, so, they knew perfectly what they have to do (e.g. Clive R."Killer" Caldwell).
A first modification of the A6M was done in 1941, by the cut of the folding wing tips.
The fighter became the A6M3.
Alone, the new engine delivered an excess of 190 hp (20%) which would have given a significant increase of top speed (568 km/h) if all other parameters remained unchanged .
But other - necessary - modifications that made the fighter heavier and increased her drag.
E.g., to increase the destructive power of the actual Zero, the two 20 mm type FF F cannons of were replaced by two type FF S, gaining 150 mps in V0 and firing 100 shells by drum instead of only 60, allowing more precises shots at longer distance.
The top speed increased to 544 kph, but the total range was less extended.
The shorter wings did not hamper the fighter's maneuverability.
Once the US Navy had finished the perfecting of the F6 F Hellcat, a bit after the mid-year of 1943, the Zero loose partly her climbing speed advantage.
{At first, the Hellcat was conceived to use of the Curtiss 2600 engine delivering 1,600 hp.
It appeared clearly under-powered against the Zero, so, the F6 F was fitted successfully with the Pratt & Whitney 2800 engine delivering 2,000 hp.
This report on a production Hellcat gave circa 10 minutes to climb to 6,000 m.}
In the Summer of 1942, the Imperial Navy was convinced the Zero had to fly faster while continuing its refusal of the Kinsei engine(!).
A lot of aerodynamic modifications led to the A6M5, including a real armor, the cannons became belt fed, each engine cylinder exhausted backward and the stressed skin of the structure was strengthened to enabled dive speeds up to 667 kph.
The top speed increased to 565 km/h at 6,000 m to which the climb was done in 7' 00".
The weight at take off was 2,733 kg, so the wing loading became 128 kg/m², always lighter than those of the Spitfire Mk V (137 kg/m²).
This was a good - but too late advance - which may had been very useful before the Battle of Midway, by a significant amount of lives of Japanese fighter pilots who could have been saved.
This was a good - but too late advance - which may had been very useful before the Battle of Midway, by a significant amount of lives of Japanese fighter pilots who could have been saved.
As you know now, since 1940, Mitsubishi was trying to convince the IJN to use its Kinsei engine in place of the Nakajima Sakae on the A6M fighters.
For some never published reasons, this lobbying was never successful.
However, once the Nakajima plant in charge of producing the Sakae engine destroyed in an aerial bombing by the US B 29, at the end of the 1944-45 Winter, the IJN condescended to began to accept solution of common sense.
Despite the desperate aerial situation, the Japanese Navy demanded some tests, those it had ever refused !
Despite the desperate aerial situation, the Japanese Navy demanded some tests, those it had ever refused !
Obviously, these test were perfectly successful, the new Mitsubishi Zéro type A6M8, fitted with a 1560 hp engine (weighting 675 kg), was able to fly at 573 kph, climbed to 6,000 m in 6' 50" and she had a VNE of 741 kph.
The armament was enhanced by 2 more 20 mm cannons and the replacement of the light machine guns by two 13.2 mm ones.
Such enhancement may be done to obtain result against the Boeing B 29 bombers, which fly at too high altitude for most of the other Japanese fighters.
The combat radius was the half part of the one of the A6M2 (the price of the new power!) and the wing loading increased to 148 kg/m² (clearly less than the Allied fighters had).
The order of production for 6,300 was published. But too much time had been wasted.
The minimal amount of this variant which were built were now useless...
The armament was enhanced by 2 more 20 mm cannons and the replacement of the light machine guns by two 13.2 mm ones.
Such enhancement may be done to obtain result against the Boeing B 29 bombers, which fly at too high altitude for most of the other Japanese fighters.
The combat radius was the half part of the one of the A6M2 (the price of the new power!) and the wing loading increased to 148 kg/m² (clearly less than the Allied fighters had).
The order of production for 6,300 was published. But too much time had been wasted.
The minimal amount of this variant which were built were now useless...
Oversimplified summary of the Pacific War
The Starting Act
The first battle occurred the September 13, 1940, when 13 Zero, escorting 60 bombers G3M, downed all the 27 Chinese fighters of Russian origin (Polikarpov I 153 and I 16) who tried to stop them.
The Japanese losses were only 3 bombers downed by the Chinese AA fire.
The new A6M1 outclassed completely the enemy fighters, even if each Zero had to destroy, in average, more than two Chinese fighters.
The new Japanese fighter had demonstrated her real domination. Nevertheless, it was, may be, a very great risk taking for a nation wanting to go to war with the USA, to display such an asset.
I cannot describe precisely the Pacific War as a seaman could do.
My only purpose is to highlight the extremely fast changes of conflict situations, so I'm interested only in losses.
Pearl Harbor: A damn first!
In 1940, unfortunately, the Allies failed to prevent Hitler's conquest of Norway, despite a real use of UK aircraft-carriers. One may explain that:
- I already wrote in a previous post how the aerial composition of the British on-board groups was questionable.
- I highlighted also that the competence of the HMS Glorious captain had been assessed in a very optimistic manner, inducing a terrific tragedy...
Six months later, fortunately, the successful attack of the Regia Marina battleships, at Tarento, by the Fleet Air Arm (night from 11th to 12th November, 1940) demonstrated that a well conceived strike benefiting from a very relevant commander (Admiral Andrew Cunningham) could have a real strategical importance.
Nevertheless, most of the damaged Italian battleships have been repaired in about 2 months.
Nevertheless, most of the damaged Italian battleships have been repaired in about 2 months.
Until this very day, the battleships were seen - by the so-called "experts" and by the politicians - as invulnerable.
At the beginning of the Pacific War, the 7 December 1941, the IJN had a strength of 500 operational A6M2 (other data in the literature give 400 of these fighters), among them 330 were in first line.
The attack on Hawaï was conducted in two successive waves, each of them protected by about 40 Zeros, while 50 others fighters remained to protect the Combined Fleet.
The first wave consist in more than 140 bombers and torpedo bombers that struck Pearl Harbor at 0800.
The second, a little less numerous, struck at 0915.
At 0930, all the surviving Japanese aircrafts flew back to their carriers.
These attacks induced the death of 2,500 US citizens (half of them being trapped in the USS Arizona battleship) and significant injuries for more than 1,000 others.
Among the warships, 8 battleships (including the old USS Utah used to the training of the young sailors), 3 destroyers and 2 auxiliary ships were completely out of order.
The ships whose the repair took more than 3 months must be counted as total loss: Only prestige reasons induced their total reconstruction (at a very high cost).
USA had lost 350 aircrafts among the 390 existing, most of them being strafed on their airfield.
On the Japan side, the Combined Fleet had lost one submarine, 20 bombers and 9 Zero.
The losses in fighters (11 % for the 2 waves versus 7.2% for all kinds of bombers) are easily explained by their involvement in strafing actions which exposed them to the diverse US AA fires.
Following this huge US naval defeat, the famous General Mac Arthur, who, in November 1925, had been required to participate to the martial court against Billy Mitchell for his deviance regarding the official thesis of the invulnerability of the battleships, bitterly concluded: Mitchell was right.
Moreover, he said also: "Since that very day, it's no longer possible to navigate battleships without a powerful fighter umbrella above them".
Now, we know also how Mac Arthur was shocked by this lawsuit that sentenced Mitchell whose he voted to acquit.
Potential not considered
I - Today, somebody discuss about the relevance of a possible 3rd assault wave Admiral Nagumo refused to his officers (who wanted to take the US completely out of the game).
Nagumo explained that now, all possible surprise was los,t and, also, the urgent need to repair for all the 74 aircrafts hit by the US weapons.
Obviously, some months later, as these Japanese officers had thought, Oahu island become a impregnable air base, and the US soldiers, drunk with revenge, were no longer likely to be taken by surprise.
OK, the Nagumo's arguments were absolutely relevant.
However, the real question regard not a possible third wave, but why the second wave started after a so long delay?
Attacking simultaneously all their objectives, Japanese airmen would obtain more serious results on more diverse targets.
Launching the second wave just after the take off of the last aircraft of the first one allowed a more massive impact.
This could work on the condition that both waves arrive simultaneously to their points of attack (by slowing the first wave or by accelerating the second one, whatever the means used to obtain this result).
Likely, Japanese losses would not be lower, but the American losses would be spread in a wider area, disrupting the resumption of control.
II - It appear a little amazing the Japanese Fleet did not use its withdrawal to capture the Midway islands (at circa 1,100 nmi) in the process.
OK, that was not prepared in time, nevertheless this work begun actually in the morning of the 7th December 1941 with an artillery bombing of this US base - with 127 mm shells - by 2 destroyers.
After the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese fleet still had 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 9 destroyers in, addition to its 6 aircraft-carriers: A very powerful force.
About the 74 aircrafts which returned damaged after the battle, likely, 24 hours later (the average duration for a repair), most of them would have been fully operational.
If this conquest was successful, long range bombers as the Mitsubishi G3M or G4M taking off from Midway could created a feeling of insecurity on all the Hawaï military bases.
Yes, Midway was a fairly defended air base, but the Military Japanese Staff had, at these very days, an overwhelming surprise capacity that disappeared later.
So, why such a thought was not used by the Japanese High Staff?
The answer was given to me by a historian woman of my acquaintance: Such an action design would have been contradictory to the psychology of the Japanese officers during WW II.
One of the greatest French strategist, the Admiral Pierre Barjot, wrote that victory was due to the absolute superiority of the Hellcat on the Zéro.
More exactly, that was the entire US strategy that totally smashed the Japanese one.
The US strategy consisted, first, in mass production of:
From April 1940 to August 1945 (more than 5 years), Mitsubishi produced only 10,500 Zeros (2,100 per year).
Obviously, the same imbalance was found in the training of the pilots.
One peculiar subject of amazement, may be found in the stubborn refusal of the IJN to use the Mitsubishi Kinsei engine on the A6M.
Even the experimentation was forbidden, exactly as if the deciders knew in advance they were wrong!
It looks like a big problem of corruption.
An identical mechanism hampered the development of the Mitsubishi A7 M Reppu, the successor of the Zero, which could have been already a strong opponent to the F6F Hellcat.
The IJN deciders superimposed the fitting of the Nakajima NK 9 that give her a performance level similar to the one of the A6M5.
The very late acceptance of the Mitsubishi MK 9 appeared only at the very end of WW II: The top speed of the Reppu was 630 kph, climbing to 6,000 m was done in 6' 7", to 10,000 m in 15' 20".
Only 10 were produced, two years too late...
Fighters are conceived and produced to protect their bombers and their bases, so too the fleets from which they took off.
In the IJN, less than 20 % of the aircrafts on-board of the aircraft-carriers were fighters.
The Mitsubishi A6M2 was - by far - the best fighter of its period, nevertheless she could not survive to the attacks of too much opponents in a very short time.
If you produced too few naval fighters, the ships of your fleet - especially those that carrying troops and infantry material - would have few chance of survival because only fighters could destroy their most efficient opponents.
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Potential not considered
I - Today, somebody discuss about the relevance of a possible 3rd assault wave Admiral Nagumo refused to his officers (who wanted to take the US completely out of the game).
Nagumo explained that now, all possible surprise was los,t and, also, the urgent need to repair for all the 74 aircrafts hit by the US weapons.
Obviously, some months later, as these Japanese officers had thought, Oahu island become a impregnable air base, and the US soldiers, drunk with revenge, were no longer likely to be taken by surprise.
OK, the Nagumo's arguments were absolutely relevant.
However, the real question regard not a possible third wave, but why the second wave started after a so long delay?
Attacking simultaneously all their objectives, Japanese airmen would obtain more serious results on more diverse targets.
Launching the second wave just after the take off of the last aircraft of the first one allowed a more massive impact.
This could work on the condition that both waves arrive simultaneously to their points of attack (by slowing the first wave or by accelerating the second one, whatever the means used to obtain this result).
Likely, Japanese losses would not be lower, but the American losses would be spread in a wider area, disrupting the resumption of control.
II - It appear a little amazing the Japanese Fleet did not use its withdrawal to capture the Midway islands (at circa 1,100 nmi) in the process.
OK, that was not prepared in time, nevertheless this work begun actually in the morning of the 7th December 1941 with an artillery bombing of this US base - with 127 mm shells - by 2 destroyers.
After the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese fleet still had 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 9 destroyers in, addition to its 6 aircraft-carriers: A very powerful force.
About the 74 aircrafts which returned damaged after the battle, likely, 24 hours later (the average duration for a repair), most of them would have been fully operational.
If this conquest was successful, long range bombers as the Mitsubishi G3M or G4M taking off from Midway could created a feeling of insecurity on all the Hawaï military bases.
Yes, Midway was a fairly defended air base, but the Military Japanese Staff had, at these very days, an overwhelming surprise capacity that disappeared later.
So, why such a thought was not used by the Japanese High Staff?
The answer was given to me by a historian woman of my acquaintance: Such an action design would have been contradictory to the psychology of the Japanese officers during WW II.
.jpg/800px-Aerial_view_of_Midway_Atoll_on_24_November_1941_(80-G-451086).jpg) |
| The Midway islands in November 1941 |
The Campaign of South-East Asia
From the 7th December 1941 to the first days of May 1942, The Japanese losses were very low if they are compared to the Allied ones.
During the conquest of Philippines, the total of Allied losses was 146 000 men and the Japanese losses were "only" 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers following the sources.
The aerial Allied losses appeared also as tremendous while nobody evokes the subject of the Japanese losses.
This may be interpreted as a part of the apparent scorn of some Anglo-Saxons (or, also, Netherlanders) - facing people differing from themselves: They do not think the Japan was able to attack any part of their empires.
The low level of Japanese losses, as the tremendous level of the Allied ones appeared also as a consequence of the fighter escort for the Japanese raids, an unusual practice among the Allies.
The Battle of the Coral Sea (May 4-8, 1942) was a real warning to Japan even that was not understood by the IJN deciders.
Apart the complexity of the maneuvers of the 2 fleets in the presence, the losses appears to be rather balanced:
US fleet Japanese fleet
P-A Lexington Shôhô sunk
" Yorktown Shôkaku Out Of Order
Dest. 1 1 sunk
Aircrafts 69 92 downed
Men 656 966 KIA
From each side, the losses were cruel.
The clear worsening of the Japanese losses (60% of the total losses) demonstrated the Americans became tactically more smart and, also, that US navals shipyards were absolutely much more efficient and diligent that the Japanese ones.
Although the Naval Japanese Air Force was technically much more advanced than the one of the US Navy, that was not sufficient to save its two carriers nor to protect its own bombers !
On the other hand, this time, the US Navy Air Force escorted all its bombers and torpedo-bombers.
That highlighted the lack of auto-protection of the Japanese aircrafts, and, mostly the extreme lack of fighters.
The Shôkaku was sorely missed in the Battle of Midway.
Among the US, the Yorktown, whose repairs would - usually - take several weeks, returned at sea juste in time to participate to the battle of Midway.
The losses were:
US fleet Japanese fleet
P-A Yorktown Akagi sunk
" Kaga sunk
" Sôryû sunk
" Hiryû Sunk
Cruiser Mikuma sunk
Destroyers 1 1 sunk
Aircrafts 150 248 downed
Men 307 3,057 KIA
The terrible loss of four excellent carriers displayed that, even such ships had a key role in the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese admirals did not consider them as their most precious combat tool: They never protect them.
The Japanese human losses increased strongly by comparison with the US ones (the new ratio of the Japanese losses reported to the total losses was 10/11).
It is said the "Thatch weave" maneuver disturbed Nippon pilots.
That maneuver was conceived by John S. Thatch before Pearl Harbor, after a long period of intense reflection as also after numerous mock combats and, certainly, after the reading of the Chennault report about the Zero fighter as she appeared in 1940.
The high level of Japanese losses - among them, very experienced pilots - were not sufficient to persuade the Japanese deciders either to modify completely their strategical methods or to go to a more peaceful approach.
In only two battles, very close in time, the US Navy had got rid of the strongest strike force of the Empire of the Rising Sun.
Among the specific problems of Japan at that point, there was the brutal stop of the mass production of the on-board bombers that attacked Pearl Harbor.
The remaining bombers were worn out aircrafts, likely in quite bad condition and flying slower.
During the conquest of Philippines, the total of Allied losses was 146 000 men and the Japanese losses were "only" 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers following the sources.
The aerial Allied losses appeared also as tremendous while nobody evokes the subject of the Japanese losses.
This may be interpreted as a part of the apparent scorn of some Anglo-Saxons (or, also, Netherlanders) - facing people differing from themselves: They do not think the Japan was able to attack any part of their empires.
The low level of Japanese losses, as the tremendous level of the Allied ones appeared also as a consequence of the fighter escort for the Japanese raids, an unusual practice among the Allies.
The Battle of the Coral Sea (May 4-8, 1942) was a real warning to Japan even that was not understood by the IJN deciders.
Apart the complexity of the maneuvers of the 2 fleets in the presence, the losses appears to be rather balanced:
US fleet Japanese fleet
P-A Lexington Shôhô sunk
" Yorktown Shôkaku Out Of Order
Dest. 1 1 sunk
Aircrafts 69 92 downed
Men 656 966 KIA
From each side, the losses were cruel.
The clear worsening of the Japanese losses (60% of the total losses) demonstrated the Americans became tactically more smart and, also, that US navals shipyards were absolutely much more efficient and diligent that the Japanese ones.
Although the Naval Japanese Air Force was technically much more advanced than the one of the US Navy, that was not sufficient to save its two carriers nor to protect its own bombers !
On the other hand, this time, the US Navy Air Force escorted all its bombers and torpedo-bombers.
That highlighted the lack of auto-protection of the Japanese aircrafts, and, mostly the extreme lack of fighters.
The Shôkaku was sorely missed in the Battle of Midway.
Among the US, the Yorktown, whose repairs would - usually - take several weeks, returned at sea juste in time to participate to the battle of Midway.
The losses were:
US fleet Japanese fleet
P-A Yorktown Akagi sunk
" Kaga sunk
" Sôryû sunk
" Hiryû Sunk
Cruiser Mikuma sunk
Destroyers 1 1 sunk
Aircrafts 150 248 downed
Men 307 3,057 KIA
The terrible loss of four excellent carriers displayed that, even such ships had a key role in the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese admirals did not consider them as their most precious combat tool: They never protect them.
The Japanese human losses increased strongly by comparison with the US ones (the new ratio of the Japanese losses reported to the total losses was 10/11).
It is said the "Thatch weave" maneuver disturbed Nippon pilots.
That maneuver was conceived by John S. Thatch before Pearl Harbor, after a long period of intense reflection as also after numerous mock combats and, certainly, after the reading of the Chennault report about the Zero fighter as she appeared in 1940.
The high level of Japanese losses - among them, very experienced pilots - were not sufficient to persuade the Japanese deciders either to modify completely their strategical methods or to go to a more peaceful approach.
In only two battles, very close in time, the US Navy had got rid of the strongest strike force of the Empire of the Rising Sun.
Among the specific problems of Japan at that point, there was the brutal stop of the mass production of the on-board bombers that attacked Pearl Harbor.
The remaining bombers were worn out aircrafts, likely in quite bad condition and flying slower.
The Battle of the Solomon Islands
After the Battle of Midway, both belligerents suffered heavy losses.
This reflected the increase of the intensity of the combats as, also, the Allied discovery that the Japanese were really very good soldiers.
From the other hand, Admiral Yamamoto was well aware how Australia was nearly empty: In 1941, there was a total of about 7 millions of inhabitants in this huge country. Invading such a continent was not so difficult, at least to have a strong military base.
That could have been an exceptional asset for Japan.
This reflected the increase of the intensity of the combats as, also, the Allied discovery that the Japanese were really very good soldiers.
From the other hand, Admiral Yamamoto was well aware how Australia was nearly empty: In 1941, there was a total of about 7 millions of inhabitants in this huge country. Invading such a continent was not so difficult, at least to have a strong military base.
That could have been an exceptional asset for Japan.
But the Japanese Imperial Staff seemed not able to understand such a reasoning.
The Imperial Army was only interested by the South Asia, by Indonesia (for the petrol), and, may be, by Burma.
The Imperial Army was only interested by the South Asia, by Indonesia (for the petrol), and, may be, by Burma.
This staff "just" urged to blockade Australia that these generals saw it more as an medium size island than as a real continent that it is.
For the blockade, they advocated the occupation of several islands (e.g. the Solomon, with Guadalcanal and the Papua-New Guinea).
The admirals of the IJN obeyed and disembarked troops on the North-East coasts of these islands.
Among the tactical parameters these pedestrians neglected, was the climate.
It turn out that these islands were situated in the equatorial wet zone that induced a true jungle, very hard to cross, free waters, infested by numerous and dangerous parasites, and local populations perfectly fitted to live in such conditions.
Moreover, the generals of the Imperial Japanese Army seem not aware of the logistic difficulties created by the poor fuel capacities of their own country.
To be efficient, their soldiers needed food, weapons, ammunition and health cares.
Any refueling needed merchant ships, slow for economical reasons, not really defended, needing escort ships to minimize aerial and submarine attacks aériennes et sous-marines.
Worst, the US used of 3 decisive assets:
On the Japanese side, weapons, ships and aircrafts were of high quality and most of the military were really well trained..
However, their martial philosophy, one said as being inherited from the ancient samouraïs, induced an exaggerated disregard on death, turning too easily to a scorn of life.
For this reason, all the concept of survival or of rescue of the downed pilots were seldom taken into account.
Combats were very hard from either sides: E.g., from August 1942 to February 1943, the Battle of Guadalcanal opposed 75,000 Allied soldiers and seamen to 50,000 Japanese.
It costed the life to circa 20,000 Japanese and 7,000 Allied soldiers. Material losses were also very heavy:
1943 opened a new age in the war: The first real effects of the extraordinary intensive mass production of ships and at least very modern aircrafts by the USA.
Owing to a lot of administrative refusals, the aeronautical industry was not able to produce the expected fighters in time...
The Kill of Japan
The following battles worsened the Japanese aerial losses.
The most famous was the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19 to 20, 1944) the US propagandists christened "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot ".
Since the beginning, it was already a done deal.
To the 15 US aircraft-carriers able to deploy 900 up-to-date aircrafts, the IJN could oppose 9 aircraft-carriers with 450 aircrafts.
To the US twenty-one cruisers and 68 destroyers, the IJN opposed 13 cruisers and 31 destroyers.
It is said that 300 Japanese land based aircrafts must be added (but it seems most of them had been destroyed before they were air-worthy).
The balance was clear:
For the blockade, they advocated the occupation of several islands (e.g. the Solomon, with Guadalcanal and the Papua-New Guinea).
The admirals of the IJN obeyed and disembarked troops on the North-East coasts of these islands.
 |
| A decisive battlefield with some dates of the reconquest, island by island, by the US Navy and the US MC |
Among the tactical parameters these pedestrians neglected, was the climate.
It turn out that these islands were situated in the equatorial wet zone that induced a true jungle, very hard to cross, free waters, infested by numerous and dangerous parasites, and local populations perfectly fitted to live in such conditions.
Moreover, the generals of the Imperial Japanese Army seem not aware of the logistic difficulties created by the poor fuel capacities of their own country.
To be efficient, their soldiers needed food, weapons, ammunition and health cares.
Any refueling needed merchant ships, slow for economical reasons, not really defended, needing escort ships to minimize aerial and submarine attacks aériennes et sous-marines.
Worst, the US used of 3 decisive assets:
- They might use of radars on their ships which warned them in case of "surprise" attack and give them a great precision of fire, even in foggy weather or at night.
- Their capacity to detect the financial costs in every things convinced them of the really tremendous cost of the life of each soldier, in particular of life of their pilots. They developed equipment helping their survival.
- At last, they might use of the secret code of the IJN, that explaining easily most of the Japan strategic failures.
On the Japanese side, weapons, ships and aircrafts were of high quality and most of the military were really well trained..
However, their martial philosophy, one said as being inherited from the ancient samouraïs, induced an exaggerated disregard on death, turning too easily to a scorn of life.
For this reason, all the concept of survival or of rescue of the downed pilots were seldom taken into account.
Combats were very hard from either sides: E.g., from August 1942 to February 1943, the Battle of Guadalcanal opposed 75,000 Allied soldiers and seamen to 50,000 Japanese.
It costed the life to circa 20,000 Japanese and 7,000 Allied soldiers. Material losses were also very heavy:
- Circa 30 Allied ships (among them 2 aircrafts-carriers) and more than 600 aircrafts.
- Circa 40 Japanese ships (among them 1 light aircrafts-carrier) and about 700 aircrafts.
1943 opened a new age in the war: The first real effects of the extraordinary intensive mass production of ships and at least very modern aircrafts by the USA.
Owing to a lot of administrative refusals, the aeronautical industry was not able to produce the expected fighters in time...
The Kill of Japan
The following battles worsened the Japanese aerial losses.
The most famous was the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19 to 20, 1944) the US propagandists christened "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot ".
Since the beginning, it was already a done deal.
To the 15 US aircraft-carriers able to deploy 900 up-to-date aircrafts, the IJN could oppose 9 aircraft-carriers with 450 aircrafts.
To the US twenty-one cruisers and 68 destroyers, the IJN opposed 13 cruisers and 31 destroyers.
It is said that 300 Japanese land based aircrafts must be added (but it seems most of them had been destroyed before they were air-worthy).
The balance was clear:
- The US loose 109 mens and 123 aircrafts, among them 80 were lost because they were too short of fuel to be able to land on their carriers (it is not totally excluded that some fuel leaks had resulted from the combats).
- Japan loose 3,000 men, 3 great carriers, 2 tanker and a lot of aircrafts: From 550 to 645 downed following En. Wikipedia - which, evoke some exaggerations - and 395 following the same media in Japanese language.
- In the worth case, the USA had a score of 30 to 1 vs Japan, and in the less unfavorable case, USA beat the Japan by 5 to 1
One of the greatest French strategist, the Admiral Pierre Barjot, wrote that victory was due to the absolute superiority of the Hellcat on the Zéro.
More exactly, that was the entire US strategy that totally smashed the Japanese one.
The US strategy consisted, first, in mass production of:
- aircrafts-carriers (128 when Japan surrendered),
- many aircrafts,
- as also many pilots.
From April 1940 to August 1945 (more than 5 years), Mitsubishi produced only 10,500 Zeros (2,100 per year).
Obviously, the same imbalance was found in the training of the pilots.
One peculiar subject of amazement, may be found in the stubborn refusal of the IJN to use the Mitsubishi Kinsei engine on the A6M.
Even the experimentation was forbidden, exactly as if the deciders knew in advance they were wrong!
It looks like a big problem of corruption.
An identical mechanism hampered the development of the Mitsubishi A7 M Reppu, the successor of the Zero, which could have been already a strong opponent to the F6F Hellcat.
The IJN deciders superimposed the fitting of the Nakajima NK 9 that give her a performance level similar to the one of the A6M5.
The very late acceptance of the Mitsubishi MK 9 appeared only at the very end of WW II: The top speed of the Reppu was 630 kph, climbing to 6,000 m was done in 6' 7", to 10,000 m in 15' 20".
Only 10 were produced, two years too late...
Fighters are conceived and produced to protect their bombers and their bases, so too the fleets from which they took off.
In the IJN, less than 20 % of the aircrafts on-board of the aircraft-carriers were fighters.
The Mitsubishi A6M2 was - by far - the best fighter of its period, nevertheless she could not survive to the attacks of too much opponents in a very short time.
If you produced too few naval fighters, the ships of your fleet - especially those that carrying troops and infantry material - would have few chance of survival because only fighters could destroy their most efficient opponents.
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