To minimize combat losses in the MS 406 fighters squadrons, the Staff ordered these fighters to be escorted by better ones! (revised the 14 of August 2023 ***)

{Recall: The mastering the Skies

From the Battle of Verdun, 1916, to the present 21th Century, fighters are the key of any battlefield :

• First, they establish their mastering in all flight space above the troops of their own country (especially during an offensive phase);

• Second, they will obtain the same achievement above the battlefield (this may be a bit more difficult); 

• Lastly, the two preceding steps being achieved, they may establish their domination beyond enemy lines to facilitate as much as possible any Allied strike against the enemy.

These three steps impose to respect some conditions :

1. To have a sufficient amount of fighter pilots able to face all possible situations (not very simple at all).                                                                                                                            
2. These fighters pilots must satisfy a lot of requests allowing them to annihilate quickly as much as possible enemy aircrafts:   

• They must be fast enough to catch these aircrafts. 

• They must climb fast enough (at any altitude) to prohibit discovery (or bombing) by enemy recce aircrafts of any friendly military structure.    

• If the fight was badly started (or being hampered by a simple lack of ammunition), these fighters have to allow a well trained pilot to escape and to return to his airbase.              

At last, an efficient warning system must allow our fighter pilots to take off as quickly as possible and to be positioned in the best tactical situation for attacking enemies (i.e. at a higher altitude than enemy aircrafts).}

Brief inventorie of Morane equipped French Fighters groups the 10 of May, 1940 at 0400

At this very moment, the Armée de l'Air's Great Staff was really aware of the above principles. 

But it had lost his illusions about the Morane-Saulnier 406, so-called "the best fighter in the World" by some French politicians (Pierre Cot) as by his "think tank" of the CEMA, that influenced him a lot. 

The operational experiments of November 1938, during which MS 406 was completely defeated by older fighters (of 1932), resulted only in the exile of GC I/7 in Syria (where nobody was a threat for our flag).

Nobody dared to question the mass production of this fighter...

Few months later, tactical difficulties of Morane fighter were again detected during mock combats between her and the Curtiss H 75.

During the Phoney War, fighting between Morane 406 and Messerschmitt Bf 109, confirmed the worried situation of Armée de l'Air. 

Now, we know Morane's pilots complained very early about the performances of this fighter.

In January 1940, the development of the Bloch 152 was just completed. 

Bloch fighters that just left factories were still not all up to date. 

Most of them were fitted with the old and totally inefficient motor cowling and lacked the rearward exhaust pipes:Their top speed at altitude was limited to 482 kph, instead of 510 kph. 

So, they were performing as it is said (falsely) about the Morane 406 but with almost twice the firepower.



Similarly, the Dewoitine 520, whose development was fairly completed in February 1939, achieved a top speed of 527 kph and a climbing time to 8,000 m of 13'45'' with her Hispano 12 Y 29 engine. 
She was never mass produced as is, despite it could be already effective in June 1939. 

The too cleaver deciders, in their magnificent Air Ministry palace, preferred another engine, the  Hispano 12 Y 45 fitted with the - really - excellent Szydlowski-Planiol supercharger, which allowed an increase of the critical altitude by 1,500 to 2,000 m.

They expected a better speed (560 kph) at circa 6,000 m.

But, as you know, the devil is in the details, details completely overlooked by these deciders.

The new engine being longer than the preceding one, so the modified new variant of the D 520 needed to be lengthened, increasing the normal take-off weight from 2,530 kg to 2,750 kg.

The new variant had some advantages: She had a better fire power, she had a 600 km longer ferry range, due to unprotected new wing tanks (which needed to be totally empty before any attempt of aerobatics).

Nevertheless, the first mass produced Dewoitine, which was the new variant, appeared only in November 1939, and all the perfecting had to be done again.

So, the first operational sorties occurred only after the May 12, 1940: Very, very late, isn't it?

A 4 steps lesson 

{The data I used here came from the excellent book of MM. Comas et al., Le Morane-Saulnier 406, Lela Presse, in French}


Fortunately, during the Phoney War, aerial French losses were not very dramatic. 

May be, either the German pilots were insufficiently trained (that being not very likely), or the Luftwaffe want to make the French asleep.

As seen by fighter pilots, the following Campaign of France might be organized in 4 steps imposed by the Reich.

I - From May 10 to 13 , the German Jagdwaffe flew almost exclusively above both the Netherlands and Belgium. The aim was to persuade Allied deciders that the future military operations would be very similar to the August-September 1914 ones. This deception strategy was highly successful.

II - From May 14 to 22, the Luftwaffe protected the famous Guderian offensive. That was accompanied by a systematic bombing of the French airfields (not too far from the German lines).

III - From the May 23 to the June 2, the Luftwaffe attacked mainly several important components of the Dunkirk-Lille pocket, the main goal being to destroy in one unique strike all the Belgian, British and French armies and almost all their equipment. 
      
Most of this effort was used to destroy military vessels or transport boats (with their excellent Ju 87 Stuka), the remaining effort being used to destroy methodically the fortified positions and heavy weapons used by the surviving French soldiers to allow evacuation of Allied troops.

IV - From the June 3 to June 24, the Luftwaffe was very active to support the current offensives. Once Paris declared "open city" (June 11, 1940) and the major transfer of the French military aircrafts beyond the Mediterranean Sea (since May 16) favored obviously all tasks of Wehrmacht and of Luftwaffe.



Step one: 

The Armée de l'Air staff placed its fighter squadrons in an astonishingly complex geography. 

The position of Curtiss H 75 equipped squadrons (in the North of Paris) may signify they were seen, then, as their best fighters (before the arrival of the D 520).  

The Jagdwaffe, already involved on attacks over Belgium and the Netherlands, had not a sufficient amount of fighters to escort all German bombers attacking France's airfields.
Doing so, it reinforced the credibility of the hypothesis that German Staff would reuse the famous Schlieffen plan without modifications.

The 10 of May, most of German bombers were unescorted. Nevertheless, during all their flight over France, they were perfectly guided by their radio-electronic means. 

Seven Morane equipped groups (each with 2 squadrons) gathered a significant part of French aerial defense:

• GC III/1, at Norrent-Fontes (62), the best of all Morane-Saulnier equipped GC (fighter groups) downed 8 bombers for the loss of one fighter (pilot WIA).         

• GC I/2, at Toul-Ochey (54), won 4 victories (among them 1 Bf 109 E), without loss.                                      
• GC II/7, at Wez-Thuisy (51), won 4 victories against the loss of 2 fighters facing several Bf 110, but, also, 9 more by bombing on their airfield.                                                                                                                             
• GC III/2, at Cambrai-Niergnies (59), won 3 victories but had lost 4 Morane in combat and 10 more by bombing on their airfield.                                                                                                                 

• GC III/7, at Vitry-le-François (51), won 2 victories, had lost 1 Morane in combat, but 3 more by bombing on their airfield.                                                                                                              

• GC II/2, at Laon-Chambry (02), won 2 victoires but had lost 1 MS 406.                                                                                                                                   
• GC III/6, at Chissey (39), won 2 victories but had lost 2 Morane.

GC III/3 and GC I/6 (as, obviously, GC I/7), experienced no victory and no loss, only because they were ill positioned against the German offensive: 

• GC III/3 was at Beauvais (60). In the evening the May10, it was dispatched to Maubeuge (59).

• A "super strategist" dispatched the GC I/6 near Marseille (13) to reinforce the defense against Italy, which was not so enthusiast to enter war!                                                      {I have no information explaining why that unit was not at war until the 18 of May}

• GC I/7 was at Rayak (Syria), punished because it failed to demonstrate, at Fall 1938, the MS 406 was the best fighter in the World! 
• In the contrary, it had demonstrated the Morane was completely outclassed by the Spad 510 and the Dewoitine D 510 of the previous contest!!!.

First day 

Nevertheless, the 7 MS 406 GC present at the May 10, 1940, totalled about 170 fighters, a not negligible force.

Despite these 7 units benefited of the best possible conditions, they achieved only 25 victories, which signify that only 3.57 enemy plane was downed by each squadron.

These success were counterbalanced by 11 MS 406 lost in combat. Moreover, 22 Morane were lost in airfield bombings. 

So a total of 33 Morane disappeared in only one day! One fifth of the total amount...

If the three absent groups (circa 72 MS 406) could have participate in the battle, they could add about 15 more victories and, may be, reduced the losses ratio in flight and on the ground. 

Obviously, pilots of Morane fighters, despite their excellent aerobatic capacities and their courage, suffered a lot.

The French generals leading the largest fighters units were aware of this problem and knew very well the serious disadvantages induced by the choice of Morane-Saulnier 406.
  
That may explain why they chosen the very amazing solution of escorting Morane 406 fighters squadrons by other kind of fighter planes. 

Escort missions (Step II)

These missions were assigned to Curtiss H 75 or MB 152 or Dewoitine 520 GCs, all these fighters being more performing and reliable than  MS 406.

1 - 14 of Mai, the first of such mission was decided to protect 7 MS 406 of GC III/7 which protected Sedan-Flize sector. 

They were protected by Dewoitine 520. 

The MS 406 downed 4 Hs 126 and Adj. Albert Littolff became the first French ace flying a Morane. 
At the same time, D 520 downed several Bf 109. No loss: The morale of French pilots had greatly improved. 
     
Such morale may explain the real success of the following mission (at 1730, the same day) in which 9 Morane escorted 14 Amiot 143 bombers of Cdt de Laubier over Sedan. 
These fighters stood up during 30 minutes to 12 Messerschmitt 109 E  flying 2,000 m above them! 

In the literature, this mission is universally described as a suicide...

But the real losses were two bombers, crippled by AA fire, crashed on the ground with 3 KIA and 2 POW for their 2 crews. Another bomber, unable to flew further away, emergency landed during her return flight. 

The remaining eleven bombers returned to their airbases, more or less damaged but still airworthy.

These losses have essentially to be related to the very low specified bombing altitude of 750 meters AGL. 

This had nothing to do with the real suicide missions of the Fairey Battle launched without fighter escort by the RAF since the first day of the German offensive.

The loss of 3 bombers among 14 (21.5 %), may be seen more as a rather defensive French success.

2 - 16 of May, 9 Bloch MB 152 protected 6 Morane of GC II/2. No casualties: Success.

3 - 17 of May, 6 Dewoitine 520 of GC I/3 protected 9 MS 406 of GC II/2. No German fighter but the Flak damaged some fighters: Mixed Success.

4 - 21 of May, 24 MS 406 belonging to GC III/7 and GC III/1 were used to cover troops disembarking from trains at Montdidier (Somme), were themselves protected by 9 MB 152. 

The attack of Bf 109 was tragic for GC III/7 (4 Morane downed, Lt Dyma KIA). 
Adjutant Edgar Gagnaire (GC III/1) downed a Bf 109: Serious failure.

5 - The same day, 18 Morane of GC III/6 covering the Cambrai-Bapaume sector were protected by 9 Dewoitine 520 of GC I/3. 

Clouds being too numerous at 2 000 m, the low altitude patrol flew half-an-hour under the cloud, so Flak gave it to its heart: 4 Morane fighters were badly damaged, one pilot WIA.

Six Bf 109 and 3 Bf 110 dived on the remaining fighters. Three Morane were downed, one pilot POW, one other KIA.

Apparently, the other patrols were not aware of the drama: Very serious failure.

6 -  24 of May, 9 MS 406 of GC III/3 and 9 other of GC III/6 were gathered to destroy enemy bombers.  Nine Dewoitine 520 of GC II/3 protected them. 

A German formation of 20 Dornier 17 was attacked by all French fighters, including the escorting Dewoitine (!), but 12 Messerschmitt 110 counterattacked. 

Toll was disastrous: 3 Morane were downed and 2 pilots KIA at GC III/3, group captain Castanier was KIA and one pilot was POW at GC III/6, for only 3 victories - one Bf 110 downed by Captain Duval (GC III/3) and two Do 17 for Adj. Japiot (GC III/6). 

The Dewoitine downed two Do 17 (one not confirmed): Very serious failure.

7 - 26 of May, 12 MS 406 escorted two Potez 63-11. They were protected by 6 Curtiss of GC I/4. 

All were attacked by, at least, a dozen of Messerschmitt 109. Curtiss downed four Bf 109 at the cost of 3 of their own. 

Pilots of Morane won 8 victories but they lost two fighters and two pilots were POW : Mixed Success.

8 - 27 of  May, 9 Morane of GC III/3 protected 2 Potez 63-11 of recce. They were protected by 9 Bloch 152 of GC GC I/8. 2 Bloch were lost: Mixed Success.


9 - 30 of Mai, 9 MS 406 of the II/7 were covering from 1715 to 1900 above Abbeville. They were protected by several Bloch 152 of GC I/8 and D 520 du GC I/3. 

Two Morane were damaged by Flak fire but no loss: Mixed Success.

Step III

10 - 3 of June, Nine Morane of GC III/7 took off after-noon to attack 20 Heinkel 111 involved in the Paula operation (= bombing of aeronautic sites near Paris) which were returning home. 

One He 111 was downed by Littolff and Martin. 

Ten Bf 109 counterattacked. Adjutant Martin, WIA, must land his MS 406 in emergency.

Four Dewoitine 520 of GC I/3 arrived to save the remaining MS 406. Mixed Success.

11 - 6 of June, five MS 406 of GC III/7 were protecting a mixed unit of Bréguet 693 and LéO 451. 

They were protected by D 520 belonging to GC I/3 and GC II/7.  

A formation of Bf 109 attacked the Morane. Cdt Maurice Arnoux, a famous ace of the WW I, had his fighter badly damaged, in fire, crashed. Very serious failure.

12 - 8 of June, 8 Morane in combat air patrol, flying South of the Rouen-Amiens line , protected by Dewoitine 520. 

The Morane, diving from the Sun, attacked by surprise 9 Messerschmitt 109 E. 

Captain Williame downed a Bf 109 with S/Lt Audebert and S/Lt Chalupa. In stride, Williame - alone - downed also 2 other Bf 109, becoming an ace. Success!

13 - The same day, at the end of the day, 9 MS 406 of the same GC, escorted by D 520 of GC II/3 and Bloch 152 of GC II/6, while flying to Soissons, they surprise a Ju 87 Stuka formation at 1945. 

Six Ju 87 Stuka were downed, among them 3 by Williame (one with Lt Monty). 

Two Morane were destroyed and the excellent Lt Monty was KIA. The other pilot was unhurt. Mixed Success.

Outcome of the escort missions, seen from Morane GC side

Among the 13 escort missions previously described, six may be seen as success, seven are not successful (or worth).

Such results seem not be correlated to the kind of the escorting fighter used, but to training, debriefing, even to the escort pilots themselves.

During 2 missions, two kind of escort fighters (Dewoitine 520 and MB 152) were  mixed.

It signified that 3 different fighters coexisted in the same space of fighting, inducing a difficult coordination of the maneuvers, especially when such conditions were never experienced before.

Outcome of the escort missions, seen from escort fighters side

Overall, the results are not very convincing. 

Some losses of the escorted MS 406 may be explained by an insufficient training of the escort pilots to such task.

Another reason is a rather ineffective use of the radio. 

Some times, the radio traffic was lacking in brevity, preventing vital informations from reaching the interested pilots: Likely, that caused the loss of Cdt Maurice Arnoux.  

Worth, some times, the escort fighters suffered losses.

It might be correlated to the pilots used to fly rather close to the bombers they were escorting. 

Such a behavior meets generally the wishes of the escorted crews (A. Galland, Die Ersten und die Letzten, in French translation).

Nevertheless, in a battle airspace, the fighter planes must absolutely remain as Elusive Flying Object (EFO). 

Obviously, since their flight maneuver were centered around a small area, even if this center was mobile, its movements becomes predictable and, for any attacker, escort fighters become preys as well as all escorted aircrafts. 

Moreover, numerous losses cause a lower morale in all units.

However, the idea of escorted fighters was also used during the Summer 1940 by British deciders (Battle of Britain), the Hurricane attacking the German bombers while Spitfire counterattacked the Messerschmitt. 

What to do with MS 406 ?

In Februay 2012, I wrote the outdated military aircrafts might not be wasted because they remain deadly. One just have to learn how to use them efficiently. 

Morane 406 were very inefficient fighters, but they were still usable. 

The decision to escort them demonstrated clearly that MS 406 lacked performances for fighting  other fighters, as also, using such fighters as ground support aircrafts like it was decided by general Romatet, a bit later, were two heartbreaking examples of misuse of such aircrafts.

Some more profitable actions would have been done:

a) Complaints from pilots, at the Fall of 1939, about Morane's performances had not been immediately fixed. 

However, it was easy to fix that shortcomings of the Morane fighter: Ordering a new and better designed liquid radiator and 12 rearward exhaust pipes would have ensured her the famous top speed of 480 kph and the engine would run at lower temperature, allowing a very better efficiency. 

This task might been achieved in, at most, one month. 

Instead, as often in France, some committees have been convened. The deciders ordered to change also the wings and to replace the two drum-fed machine guns by four belt-fed machine guns. 
So, only a handful of Morane 410 were produced for the end of May 1940, nine months too late.

b) Young pilots of French Air Force used Morane 317 or Morane 230 when they were at their perfecting stage. So, before they became true military pilots, they never flew faster than 210 kph, a bit more than the landing speed of their future fighters...

It was necessary to train these pilots with very faster transition aircrafts. The Morane 406 could have completed such a task.

c) Moreover, it was easy to position all the Morane fighters 200 km further from the front, a location where no Messerschmitt 109 could stay in flight. So, the German bombers would suffer, without fighter support, from about French 240 fighters.

So, we might obtain better trained fighter pilots.

The Escort Concept

The purpose of fighter escort is annihilation of any enemy fighters.

1 - In 1916, there was no escort at all: An as great amount of fighters are sent to eliminate any enemy threat in one given sector of the front. This simple method seemed appropriate for a rather small battle space (i.e. the Verdun Battle).


2 - Two years later, there were powerful aircrafts, like the twin engined Caudron R 11, with 5 machine-guns each, to repel attackers.

They introduced the notion of flying anti-aircrafts battery, which gave, 20 years later, the French SE 100 and the US Boeing B 40.

No, that's not turrets of a battle cruiser, but six of the 18 machine-guns of a Boeing B 40

Such a choice was, then, a total failure, the new weapons (0.5 cal. MG or canons) being too heavy, adding too much drag and inducing a too heavy charge of ammunition (6,000 kg for the B 40!).


3 - The fighter planes accompanying the bombers. The image of that from the Hollywood films (the fighters flying at some dozen of feets from the escorted bombers) is totally misleading.

However, as said by A. Galland, the best results of the Jagdwaffe were achieved when a strong fighter formation was sent ahead of the bombers units to wipe out all enemy aircrafts flying in the sector to be bombed.

Moreover, additional fighters would be welcomed to annihilate all surviving enemy aircraft.

In all cases, it's necessary to have a lot of fighters!


Obviously (and logically), the base of efficiency in any Fighter Command is the choice of a relevant fighter, a choice always directed by her capabilities to eliminate any military enemy aircraft. 
     
The Morane 406 never demonstrated such capabilities; However, the Nieuport 161 had all of them.


4 - Germans had a very efficient method against France, Belgium and the Netherlands, devoid of radar system: They favored systematically attacks of the Airbases occurring just before the Sunset. 

If all Allies acted quickly in imitation of enemies (following the principle: All action efficient against us may be also efficient against the enemy), the Luftwaffe might have lost a part of its harmfulness.

Instead, we used our bombers for psychological actions (leaflets dropping) which were inaudible for populations saturated with the Dr. Goebbels propaganda. .


5 - Actions against the anti-armoured convoys were not impossible: It was daily used on the Russian front (Roger Sauvage, Un du Normandie-Niemen, in French).                                                                                                                                                              
Unfortunately, as conceived by Gal. Romatet in 1940, they were very costly in pilot losses induced by the stupid will to make two passes on the targets. 

Otherwise, one might had advantage to use Bloch 151 or 152, tougher than MS 406 and more nimble than the Bréguet 693...

  

Conclusion

The German chosen, en 1936,  the very advanced Messerschmitt 109, efficient and easy to upgrade. 

The United Kindom, at the same times, fully trusted to several poor military aircrafts, to put it mildly:

• The Defiant, too heavy and devoid of any forward firing armament, 
• the Gladiator, too slow but very nimble, 
• the Hurricane, slow and using only light machine-guns, 
• the Blenheim, very slow and carrying a too light bomb load, 
• the Whitley very slow but able to carry a significant bomb load. 

Fortunately, in the medium term, the RAF could count on the Spitfire fighters as fast than was the Messerschmitt 109 but more maneuverable.

The Armée de l'Air, as also the French Air ministry, ordered an especially poor fighter, very time consuming to build and structurally outdated (= unsuited to obtain performing descendants).  

In war operations, the Morane fighter was not able to achieve most of the standard fighter missions. 

The losses of MS 406 appeared significant even at the very beginning of the German offensive, even when facing not escorted German bombers.

After the battle, some group leaders blamed their pilots to be insufficiently trained in aerobatics! The German fighter pilots seemed not sharing such a judgment.

Some generals of the Armée de l'Air (I do not know their names), showing concern for their pilots, tried the solution of the escort of fighters without achieving great success.

In facts, these generals inflicted a scathing denial on CEMA engineers: They re-assessed this "fighter" as a bomber devoid of bombs. So, the CEMA had completely failed!

I really doubt that they would have the same problem if the French Air Ministry had chosen the Nieuport 161 fighter, but you already knew that!




{From the other hand, the US weekly Defense News published, the 28 of May 2020, The F 22 imperative, a paper from MM Deptula & Birkey. 

After the crash of a F 22 Raptor, the 15 of Mai 2020, they highlight risks of attrition of the F 22 force in the military arsenal of USA. 

The authors recall :

• The F-35 was designed mainly for ground attack.

• "While the F-16 and F-15 will remain an important part of the inventory out of necessity, their operational utility will diminish given they do not address the challenges that will increasingly dominate the security environment."

• "Future next generation air dominance concepts must also proceed. However, COVID-19-related budget pressures are likely going to delay meaningful advancement in this regard. "

So, the F 22 Raptor fighter is the only key to secure US air superiority everywhere.

"Canceling the F-22’s production with half the military requirement unmet was a tragedy whose impact will be felt for years."

The only "cost-effective way to reinforce this force is to upgrade the 33 older block 20 F-22s (...) to full combat capability". 

"For those who focus on cost, are they prepared to pay the price of not having the entire F-22 force at its peak potential? That bill would be measured in strategic objectives surrendered, significant force attrition, and lives lost."

In other words, flying without a top cover of F 22 would be very dangerous for F 35 at war...}

The Netherlands 1940: Really not enough light fighters (Fokker D XXI and others) (modified May 11, 2021 *)

{Sources : Batailles Aériennes #9 (in French), July 1999; This excellent historical site on the Netherlands Battle; And also the tiny W. Green Fighters vol I and III}



The Neutrality: Rules and Price



The Battle of Netherland occurred in Mai 1940, but it appears useful to remind some data explaining how this country was defeated in only 5 days, with 10,000 casualties.

One of the causes of this defeat is the Netherlands chosen to be Neutral.

Definition : The Neutrality is the promise of a given country not to use weapons against any country except to defend themselves.

The neutral countries may be inspired by the refusal of the huge spending of money induced by any war. 

In some cases of war occurring between neighboring countries, a neutral country could obtain a significant part of the international markets.


Some examples

• Sweden, which today is often presented as a model of political virtue (!), used its neutrality. It was clearly enriched during WWII by the business done with the Hitler's Third Reich.                  

• During the Norwegian Campaign, it played a more than doubtful role when it's trains were transporting voluntarily German troops towards Norway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                
• Sweden transported again German forces toward Finland at the very beginning of the Barbarossa operation in 1941, against USSR, it considered as its hereditary enemy, the Russian nation (that Sweden conquered - founded - circa 1,000 years ago...).                                          
• After the Allied victory of 1945, Sweden funded numerous city reconstructions in Norway: Neutral or not, Sweden had a lot to be forgiven...                                                                              

• When a country proclaims its neutrality, that implies a practical ability to uphold its sovereignty, its independence and its boundaries.                                                    
• Otherwise, this country may be annexed by one of its neighbors, implying its citizen will be constraint to obey to the laws of these other countries.                                                                                                                                                                 
• {The partition of Poland, at the end of the XVIIIth century did not resulted from a will of the rulers of this country to be neutral, contrarywise, it  resulted from their indecent warmongering.}                                                                                                                                 

• So, contrarily to the story telling of the usual peace activists, neutrality is a very expensive luxury which may be only achieveded following two complementary axis: 

• Military: Creation of a powerful, well trained and highly motivated army.

• Diplomatic: Establish well prepared and discreet alliances.

• In 1940, USA were also neutral: They obtained a lot of impressive orders from all parts of the conflict.                                                                                    

• It is true that, at this times, they had no credible army, because it was devoid of tanks, US skies were protected by really insufficient - in number as in efficiency - fighters (P 36, P 40) but USA had very good long range Boeing B 17 bombers. 

• Its powerful Navy was not well led. 

• Fortunately for the USA - and for us, too - they were rich of all possible human resources, including excellent generals and admirals as was the exceptional Patton.

• Moreover, as Russia was, is, and will always be, protected by the General Winter, the USA will be always protected by both the Admiral Atlantic and the Admiral Pacific, at the cheapest price. As anti-tank ditchs, one have never done better than these two oceans.

• In 1940, Switzerland and Ireland perfectly illustrated Neutrality. 

• The Swiss territory (41,285 km²), in itself with its countless torrents, lakes and very sharp mountains, favors indisputably the own defense of it's inhabitants. 

The Swiss territory: The boundaries are in white

• The very famous Swiss banks gave also to their country a lot of powerful financial weapons. 

• Moreover, since it's creation, this country gathers a well trained and well equipped army of citizens.

• In 1937 (after the 1937 meeting of Zürich), the Helvetic Confederation chosen the Messerschmitt 109 E for the defense of its own sky (an excellent choice).  

•  This excellent fighter entered service in 1939 and, since the war was declared between France and Germany, she was efficiently employed against all aircrafts, including especially the German ones.

• Invading Switzerland was by no means an health walk.

• Another example, the Ireland Republic have a territory with a less mountainous than Swiss but still complicated terrain, with very winding roads and a people well accustomed to resist to the Germanic invaders (Vikings, then Englishmen).                                          

• The British government, involved in the WW I against Germany since August 1914, had no interest to attack the Irish Republic leaded by Eamon de Valera.                                                                                                                                    
• Hitler, in 1939, was unable to obtain an Irish alliance. And a landing on the Irish coast was much more complicated than on the British ones...

The Defense of the Netherlands: The problems of a flat and wet country

The Neutrality of the Netherlands was completely different. In 1940, this country gathered 8.8 millions of inhabitants. 

The territory, which area totaled 41,500 km², a bit more than Switzerland, included a large proportion of liquid areas (almost 1/5 of the territory (the Zuiderzee totaling 5,000 km²).

Map of the Netherlands (maximum altitude: 320 m = circa 1,000 ft) (to be compared with the Swiss one!)

That territory is the exact opposite of the Swiss one, as a significant part of the land is at a negative altitude (= under the level of the sea). 

From the other hand, one may not consider the Netherlands of 1940 to be only constituted by its European territory. 

The ambitious maritime tradition of this country led it, at the time of the Grand Admiral Michiel De Ruyter (1607-1676), to have an important war fleet which accessed to the absolute mastering of the seas.

So, this country obtained a huge colonial empire whose flagship was Indonesia which allowed, 3 centuries later, a free and independent access to petrol resources (Royal Dutch Shell). 

So, this country was extremely rich. Alas, rich may, sometimes, agree with stingy.


One may also take into account that the Dutchs never accepted the Belgian Revolution of 1832 - which sparked because the permanent Dutch bigotry and led to the independence of Belgium - under the joint aegis of France and England. 

So, the Dutch kept a grudge against these three countries.

During WW I, if the Netherlands claimed its neutrality, one Dutch citizen, Antony Fokker, gave his great engineer skill to the armies of Wilhelm II, giving him a mastering of the sky since May 1915 (in exchange of a huge amount of gold). 

After the defeat of Germany, the Dutch government gave to the fallen German Wilhelm II Emperor a comfortable and safe residence.

So, Dutch had a very pro-German government until the German offensive of May 10, 1940. 

As a logical consequence:

• They bought especially German cannons (not the best ones, unfortunately for them). 

• They experienced, on their own submarines, the German Schnorchel device, used later against all the Allied navies.

If a new war broke out in Europe, the Dutch government would have following again the same rewarding path than the one used during WW I, the Neutrality. 

It was all the more logical than the standard of the armament of the Dutch forces was, technically, not as good as the one of the belligerents of 1918 (En Wikipedia of December 2014)!

Nevertheless, the seizure of power by Adolph Hitler was seen as a great danger by some Dutch high ranking generals, but their rulers were reluctant to draw the logical consequences of this danger, especially regarding the Allies, because they hated the Allies and the Belgians. 

These politicians did not understood that an alliance cannot be seen only as a single Kriegspiel. 

That need much more than some hours of discussion between generals: The mutual help between countries impose a good knowing of the real condition of combat in each part of the future front.

Dutch soldiers in situ in 1939! An unthinkable situation for French soldiers,
 never trained, at that times, for sustaining a fighting in similar conditions.

The French soldiers successfully helped Italia from the end of 1916 to the final victory of 1918 (the link is to my post [in my blog in French] on this part of the WW I seen by my grand father André Delpey) were not in a abnormal situation. 

But, in May 1940, the Netherlands was a completely different world which would appear to French soldiers as a Water Planet, necessarily inducing a complete change regarding the design of blockhaus and the organisation of the troops movements.

When the WW II was seen as inevitable (1936), it was too late for the Dutch to obtain decisive weapons (heavy or anti-tanks guns, tanks and so on). 

As the Germans knew all their future war objectives, they want not to deliver armaments to the Dutchs, but they don't say that to them. 

That deterred Dutchs to buy some cannons from France or USA, and the USSR, which was able to fulfill such fair heavy military equipments, was not recognized at all.

There was also real possibilities with Italia, Sweden, Switzerland or Denmark, but none was concluded. 

That may explain the Germans were not convinced Netherlands was a real country!

Go through the roof, especially when there is none !

The famous German war plan, established by Herr von Schlieffen in 1905 to defeat France, involved the capability to path through the South-East of the Netherlands. 

Hitler seemed to want the complete disposal of all the European coasts for his armies.

However, the Netherlands, which may be seen as a gigantic water table, are not completely simple for motorized armies which must only follow the existing roads. 

Geography of the Netherlands

The territories of the Netherlands is meshed with numerous rivers, swampy areas and channels very close together.

It was not the best kind of terrain to maneuver tanks, as Marshal B. Montgomery finally understood it (too late), 4 years later and after having launched his offensive on Arnhem in September 1944. 


Unable to use armoured divisions which were the key of his offensive against the French forces, the best way for Hitler to attack the Netherlands was to use of paratroopers.

His war plan was a bit sophisticated in order to achieve as fast as possible a real victory.

The Wehrmacht attacked by launching troops to 3 points : 

• At the North, to the Afsluitdijke which closes the Ijselmeer,

• At the Center, to Arnhem and Wageningen,

• At the South, to Tilburg.

Simultaneously, the Luftwaffe, flying above the North Sea, brought about 15,000 infantrymen, among them paratroopers, who attacked the key cities of Rotterdam and Den Haag.

Dutch aerial materials 

The German military deciders, knowing that most of the Allied counterparts as, also, the Dutch generals, would be unable to anticipate (and thereby to withstand) such kind of attack.

Nevertheless, since 1936, the Dutch generals had created a real defense. 

They had inherited a ridiculously weak Air Force:

• One squadron of fighters (theoretically 12 aircrafts, in fact: only 11),

• One squadron of Strategical (?!) Reconnaissance, 

• One squadron of Tactical Reconnaissance ,

The entire Air Force totaling, at best, 40 aircrafts (such an amount may be compared to the 66 Dewoitine D 27 the Swiss Air Force bought in the early 30's, only for its fighter command).

For the end of the 30's, the new objective will be :

• 8 fighter squadrons, circa 100 fighters,

• 6 Reconnaissance squadrons,

• 3 Bombing squadrons.

The progression was considerable numerically speaking - an increase of about 500% - but it was also technically a real revolution, which would have created an Air Force incredibly stronger than the Polish one: 

• All the aircrafts were monoplanes; 
• Most of their landing gears were retractable;
• All aircrafts used of fair radio emitter-receivers 
• For each aircraft, the amount of machine-guns were increased by 100%;
• True bombers were built, even they were seen as aerial cruisers, like General Douhet wanted it.

The Aerial Defense was built following the traditional categories: 

• The A.A. Artillery, entirely modernized.

• The Fighter Command, which included a participation of the French and British fighters.

Unfortunately, these 2 purely Dutch parts had been created very late (from 1938), so you can understand easily why the regiment numbers could not be supplemented in time for the May 10, 1940. 

The Dutch Fighter Command totaled about sixty fighters, among them 36 D XXI Fokker single seat fighters as also an equal number of twin-engined fighter G I among them, unfortunately, a great number of G1 fighters were weaponless...


The D XXI Fokker was a minimal (but very serious) fighter (= easy to maintain and using only low cost materials) to obtain an order from a totally blind government, unable to detect the exponential increase of the nazi warmongering.

The fuselage of this fighter followed the then classical concepts (steel tubes and fabric covered structure), the wings were made of wood and fabric covered doped with bakelite (= an early plastic polymer) and the landing gear was a fixed one.

The fairly streamlined engine cowling, surrounded a 9 cylinders, air cooled radial Bristol Mercury VIII engine delivering 830 Cv at 4,250 m (quit identical to the one used on the Gloster Gladiator).

The D XXI weighted 1,600 kg empty and 2,000 kg for take off.  

The wingspan was 11 m and the wing area totaled 16.2 m², giving a wing loading of 121 kg/m², ensuring a very good maneuverability.

Fokker D XXI with the 1940 markings 

The top speed achieved 460 kph at an altitude of 5,100 m.

The cruising speed at 82 % of the power was 430 kph. 

At 340 kph (40 % of the power), the total range was close to 1,000 km.

The top indicated air speed in dive was 700 kph, a very good value.

The climb times were excellent (quite identical to those of the Messerschmitt 109 E) : 

• 3, 000 m in 3' 25",

• 6,000 m in 7' 30".

The service ceiling was 10,000 m.

Another decisive tactical asset was the relatively low weight of this fighter which was able to land on the wet soils of her country for refueling and completing the ammo before to take off again easily.

The armament of four 7.92 mm machine-guns, with 300 cartridges per gun, was identical to those used by Bloch 151 or Caudron 714 Cyclone fighters.

Following the sources, the machine-guns of the D XXI were either modern Browning ones with a muzzle velocity of 840 m/s, or old Vickers with a muzzle velocity of 740 m/s, which was insufficient.  


{The Fokker D XXI was not very different from the Nakajima Ki 27 fighter but the Japanese fighter was 15 kph faster at altitude and more nimble because her wing area was 2 m²  larger and her metallic monocoque structure was 200 kg lighter.}


The good results of the trials triggered an order for - alas - only 36 fighters from the Dutch government (in 1937), followed by Danemark, Finland as also by Spain Republic. 

There was talk for sending all these fighters to Indonesia because the Japanese expansion in China was approaching French Indochina and therefore Malaisia, the last step to land in Java or Sumatra (for oil).

Fortunately, the increasing tension between Hitler and his neighbors cancelled this stupid project.

But this fighter could have been even more efficient if fitted with more powerful engines (e.g. the PW 1830), two 12.7 MG and a retractable landing gear.



As it occurs in every country, single seat fighters were of absolutely not interest for the Dutch politicians of the moment.

So, as usual, they were pinching pennies by sacrificing in fashion "all in one".

Fokker company needed orders and gave them the Fokker G 1, a heavy fighter, fitted with 2 radial air cooled engines introducing a formula which culminated (aerodynamically speaking) with the Lockheed P 38 Lightning.

The Dutch fighter was 10.89 m long, weighted 3,300 kg empty and 4,800 kg for take off.

The wingspan was 17 m and the wing area was 38 m² (wing loading = 126 kg/m²). 

Fokker G 1 in her marking of May 1940

The armament consisted in 9 riffle-caliber machine-guns (8 in the nose and only 1 for the rear gunner).


It was also possible to carry and launch eight 50 kg bombs (as was the Fairey Battle or the Bristol Blenheim). 

The Mercury VIII engines of the Fokker delivered 830 hp (versus  the 690 hp of the Gnome & Rhône 14 Mars) but a cross section area of 1.33 m² for each motor cowling against 0.66 m² on a Bréguet 693.


From the other hand, the heaviness of this aircraft was a serious shortcoming during any emergency landing: The wheels got stuck in the Dutch wet meadows or on sand beaches.

The claimed top speed was 475 kph at 5,000 m (with the Mercury engines).

The excellent Batailles Aériennes #9 (July 1999, in French) published for her a top speed of 435 kph which is consistent with the climbing times:

• 3,000 m in 5 minutes,

• 6,000 m in 12 minutes (the 9 minutes found in certain sources for 6,000 m cannot be seen as a serious data). 

The practical ceiling was 9,000 m.

The turning maneuverability is proved by ancient videos, but the rolling rate needed a very strong pilot, at a time when no servo drive existed. 

Louis Bonte, in his Histoire des Essais en Vol (in French), acknowledged the fair flying qualities of the G1. 

Clearly, the Fokker G 1 would have been an excellent tactical light bomber or a very good night fighter

Nevertheless, as a fighter, she was completely outclassed by the Messerschmitt 109 E.



Another fighter was used for Battle of Netherlands: The Fokker D XVII, a biplane fighter which flew first in 1932.

Weighting 1,500 kg, her wing totaling an area of 20 m², her wing loading never exceed 75 kg/m², allowing her an outstanding maneuverability. 

Her top speed of 360 kph at 4,000 m was rather good, as also the total range of 800 km.

The armament gathered only 2 riffle caliber MGs; Only 11 fighters have been ordered!

When Hitler sent his Junkers 52, the Mai 10, 1940, the 7 surviving Fokker D XVII were not immediately put into action, the decidedly very naive Dutch rulers preferring to use them for advanced training, as if they still have time for this! 
Obviously, the Ju 52 (270 kph) have no escape way against such fighters.

It was not until the next day that 6 of these old fighters came into action.

With a little hindsight, we understand that these fighters could easily contributed to the destruction of the Junkers 52 carrying paratroopers at a decisive moment.


At last, the Netherlands Air Force had a modern bomber, the Fokker T V, first designed as an Air Cruiser, following the concept published by Giulio Douhet at the end of the 20's.

Fokker T. V -   

She was 16 m long and weighted 4,650 kg empty and 7,250 kg (7,600 kg overloaded) for take off. (She was a rather lightweight bomber if we compare her with the less efficient Bristol Blenheim)

Her wingspan was 21 m and the wing area totaled 66 m².

The wing loading did not exceed 110 to 115 kg/m².

With two Bristol Pegasus engines delivering 925 Cv, her top speed was close to 420 kph (Wikipedia in German language gives also 445 kph if fitted with G&R 14 N0/N1 engines).

The armament comprised one 20 mm cannon firing forward and 5 rifle caliber MG.

At a cruise speed of 350 kph, the total range was 1 550 km.

The maximum bomb load was 1,000 kg.

Unfortunately, only 16 were ordered...

The Five-Day War

The May 9, 1940 evening, the Dutch, well informed about the German offensive, put all their armies on alert.

The airbase of De Kooy, at 3,500 m to the South of the Den Helder Harbor entrance, was the first in action in the early morning of the May 10.

The 1 Ja. V.A. (fighter squadron), using eleven Fokker D XXI, took the air at 04:00.

{This day, the Dutch reaction was the best of all the Allied ones.} 

The formation gathered three patrols of 3 fighters and one of 2.

The first patrol downed quickly a Heinkel 111, while another pilot had caught up a Junkers 88 bomber and shot her down. 

Another patrol was called back to De Kooy, where Bf 110 were strafing the base. 

Unfortunately, one of the Dutch pilots preferred to attack two He 111, whose two gunners downed him.

The D XXIs, quickly called back to De Kooy, were attacked by five Bf 109. 

One of the pilots was able to perform an emergency landing just before his fighter caught fire (with no injury for him). 

His colleagues used of the excellent maneuverability of the D XXI to down two Bf 109 E. 

When all these battles were over, eight Fokker D XXI landed on their airfield, all bearing the traces of the fight.

Four of them, quickly repaired, take off again during the following hours and three more during the after-noon (with, apparently, no results).




At Schiphol, nine D XXI took off at the precise moment of the German attack. 

One Junkers 88 was downed. Two Fokker must land for repair. 

In a fight with a Bf 109, a Fokker was downed, her pilot KIA. 

Five among the Fokker XXI downed a Junkers 52 whose paratroopers were made POW. 

The 6 remaining D XXI were reconditioned.  They escorted 3 bombers Fokker T. V  at
12:15.

They were attacked by 10 Bf 109. 

These German fighters downed one D XXI fighter and damaged one other, but they lamented 3 losses of their own. 



At Waalhaven (South of the Rotterdam harbor), the Dutch crews of the eleven G1 fighters (of the 3e Ja VA) were not all present at the time of the first German bombing involving twenty seven Heinkel 111. 

So, 3 Fokker G 1 were already destroyed on the ground but the remaining 8 took off.

One G 1, devoid of gunner (killed by bombs), was quickly downed and her pilot was killed.

Another G1 downed two He 111 but must land quickly, one engine out of service. 

An identical scenario involved another G 1.

The fourth twin-engined fighter, with Lieutenant G. Sonderman, Fokker test pilot, downed one Ju 52 and two Messerschmitt 109 before landing on a beach, by lack of fuel.

Such a record (3 victories and, among them, two Bf 109 E) was exceptional for the G 1 and must be associated with the exceptional skill of her pilot. 

One other pilot land his G1 on the same beach.

The fifth G 1 downed a Ju 52 and 1 Messerschmitt before to land also on the same beach.

The sixth Fokker destroyed 2 bombers but, damaged by German fighter, had to land.

All these heavy fighters were caught or destroyed without being able to take off again. 

Only one G1 survived these fights. A very bad record for the very first mission of the type.


{The 4ème Ja. V. A. - also equipped in G1 Fokker - was unfortunately annihilated from the first moment of the bombing.} 

The main result for the Fokker G 1 was 11 victories, mainly obtained against multi-engined aircrafts, at the expense of 6 aircrafts captured, 3 fighters destroyed on the ground and only one destroyed in fight, totaling 9 losses.

The G 1 victories are clearly correlated with her armament, twice as powerful than the one of the Fokker D XXI. 

However, the amount of G1 fighters unable to take off is clearly associated with the important size of this fighter, favoring its visual detection and its aiming by the German gunners. 

They had lost a lot of fuel during the battles and, even replenished, they cannot take off again, demonstrating that no experiment had never be done previously to test such unusual take off.

The worst was, therefore, the G 1 fighters appeared only as one shot fighters.

The Fokker D XXI had clearly better records, with losses of only 3 fighters destroyed in action the May 10 and 2 fighters damaged, they achieved 9 victories.

Once the surprise was over, this fighters seemed not to be in difficult situation against the excellent Bf 109 fighters. This highlighted also the excellent training of the Dutch pilots.

The fast reappearance of numerous D XXI fighters claimed downed by the German Jagdwaffe displayed the outstanding maintenance qualities of this excellent Fokker: They were authentic war fighters. 

After this intense first fighting day, sixteen D XXI Fokker fighter (among the twenty initially available = 80%) survived versus only one G 1 Fokker among eight (= 12.5%).



The T. V. Fokker crews had to defend themselves from the start:  Confronted to a German bomber formation, they downed 2 of them with their powerful 20 mm cannon.

Later, they were used to bomb military objectives. When such missions were flown without escort, the losses were on the high side. 

Moreover, an abnormally weak proportion of hits was observed. 

One hypothesis to explain such a result could lie in the very low wing loading, needed for the good maneuverability (they effectively demonstrated) which had an adverse effect in turbulent atmosphere.

The May 13, all T. V bombers have been downed.



The Battle of the Netherlands was over the May 15, after the capitulation of the Dutch Army, as the consequence of the terrorist German bombing of Rotterdam. 

The German aerial losses were 530 aircrafts crashed on the Dutch soil. 
If the Zeeland Battle remained active a couple of day, the records did not change significantly.

Most of the German losses regard the aircrafts carrying paratroopers and other infantrymen. 

This fleet gathered 430 Junkers 52, each carrying 17 soldiers, the first batch totaling more that 7,000 men. Some of the Ju 52, which had landed in the Dutch air base were able to go back to finish their work. 

This armada was escorted by numerous Messerschmitt 109 fighters which missed seriously to the German bombers attacking the French airbases at the same instant. 

The Dutch AA fire gathered 270 up-to-date cannons.

One must add 450 light machine-guns taken to the German troops fleeing the Allied ones in 1918.

The aerial warning was only based on human observers or on acoustical devices (it is also said that 2 prototypes of radar was used).

The combination of these various means was responsible of more than hundred victories, especially at the expense of the Junkers 52 which flew at low altitude to land and disembark the soldiers they carried. 

It is possible that some of these victories was the executions of aircraft previously damaged by Dutch or Allied fighters.

We know, today, the Fokker facility had to repair more than hundred Junkers 52 during the months following that battle. A  lot among the others were definitely lost (circa 150).

Conclusion for the IIIrd Reich

About one half of the German aerial transport capabilities have been disabled of destroyed during this first efficient aerial offensive in History.

It's very likely these Junkers 52 missed to Hitler for the following steps of the WW II (the Crete in 1941, Stalingrad in 1943, etc).

But it's exactly the rules of the Game of any War: All the human and the material resources created to the early beginning of the war is most likely to result in a shortage of equipment.

Yes, Hitler missed equipment since the end of 1942. 

Yes, his logistics was perfect to defeat France, after the North European countries. 

But, for the inevitable continuation of the operations, the same logistics was totally insufficient.

It remains that the daring German aerial operation used in May 1940 to submit the Netherlands, pave the way to a lot of similar operations in the World since.

Conclusion for the Netherlands

Despite a number of shortcomings, all related to the Dutch politicians, and a very well planed and well executed German attack, the Dutch army defended its country rather well.

Doing that, it was threatening to make the battle last twice as long as expected by the OKW.

If some actions could been decided more early, they would have positives consequences:

• Creation of an armored division in order to counter attack any invasion;

• Enhancing the strength of the artillery;

• create a more numerous aerial top cover: The 72 ordered fighters were totally insufficient. More than 200 fighters was the minimum amount needed.

• Inside the Dutch Fighter Command, favoring the lightest fighters - the Fokker D XXI and the aircrafts which were developed from her concepts.

In such case, the bombing of Rotterdam could had been avoided, because the paratroopers might not be trapped in this city.

Once more time, like many others, the Dutch politicians chosen to be blind about the interest of their own country and they lacked courage and far-sighting (later, they chosen the suicide-fighter F 104, and more recently, again, they chosen the poor F 35 JSF). 

From the other hand, all the Dutch and Allied soldiers demonstrated their great courage, but they were overwhelmed by the German ones who were perfectly trained for such very innovative form of war.

.