The Dewoitine D.520 - as seen by her pilots (version II) (revised 17 / 03 / 2015)

The Dewoitine D.520 was undoubtedly the best fighter plane used  by the French Armée de l’Air before the defeat of June 1940.

Her capability of fast cruising - 480 kph - was a major asset even several year after 1940. 

It allowed to  Bulgarian pilots, in 1943, to make frontal attacks to B17 ou B24 bomber formations while avoiding the escorting P 38, even the later were strikingly faster, but clearly less nimble. 

Only in 1944, the P 51 ( wiped them from the Bulgarian sky!

In 1940, the climbing speed of the Dewoitine fighter, average up to 4,000 m, was very good above, giving her a one minute margin over the Bf 109 E when climbing from 5,000 m to 8,000 m, because she use a supercharger of very better technology (Szyldowski-Planiol S 39).

Her diving speed (about 850 kph) was, may be, a bit better than that of the Bf 109E. 
But the D.520 was especially more maneuverable than the German fighter at high speed. 

Several French pilots of 1940 had said to Danel and Cuny : "A 109 which was dive flying was already dead."

A good roll rate gave her a clear asset at the beginning of an evasive or of a scissor attack.  


The Dewoitine fighter enjoyed a larger range than any other European single seater. 

The Hispano-Suiza 12Y45 was very reliable for its times. 

These two assets allowed easy change of location. 

For example, all of the D.520 of the French Air Forces crossed the Mediterranean sea during the third week of June 1940. 
To my knowledge, only one fail to land safely in Algeria and ditched near a beach, the pilot being safe. 

As early as the June, 25, 1940, three French pilots flew successfully from Toulouse-Francazal airport to continue the fight for the Free France with General de Gaulle. 

All three landed safely near Southampton, the complete distance they flew being likely much more than  the ~1000 km in bee-line, owing to the need to avoid German fighters.  

Personnel document of the author - in Cyan, the combat range of a Dewoitine D 520 taking off at Le Bourget Airport.                                                        - in Red, the combat range of a Messerschmitt Bf 109 E starting from the same place.

The true shortcoming of the D.520 was her tendency to make ground loops, because production aircrafts fitted a tail-wheel, a device the first 3 prototypes did not have. 
Moreover, this device was ill-designed.


All the French test pilots had begun to fly on Nieuport 62 fighters which were rather special when running on the usual rough surface of the actual French airfields. 

So, they were "Darwinianly" selected to steer perfectly such planes on such surfaces and also they flew the production aircrafts after a long use of the prototypes. 


So, they had not perceived the landing problem for more recent pilots or for pilots being used to very comfortable airfields.

 Very late, after the experimental fixing of the ground looping obtained by the Italian pilots, the French staff understood the problem and introduced a similar patch: The standstill of the tail weel.

Regarding the flying qualities, most of the pilots agree to acknoledge the very good qualities of the D.520 as a fighter, as it appears in the Colonel de Turenne report, who was in command of the groupement 24 (in 13 Juin 1940, premières frappes en métropole, les combats franco-italiens, Batailles Aériennes, #11, 2000):

"The D.520, used for the first time by confirmed pilots holder of several victories, was seen as fast, manoeuvrable, allowing easy attacks against the Italian bombers. However, the pilots warned us to avoid any turning manoeuver while shooting an aircraft in order to be efficient, because the D.520 skids during turn".

The pilots think the cannon is most efficient than the machine guns. They said me: "the cannon kills, the machine gun hurts only". They have learn unofficially that the cannon will be no more fitted on the Dewoine fighter. They asked me to use my influence with the command to reject such a project. I have done that with pleasure because I'm convinced one may take into account of the advise of three pilots who have been victorious several times each.

This report is significant of the contrast the Dewoitine 520 instituted in the mind of her pilots by comparison to the previous fighters.

[NB: To my knowledge, the D.520 was never projected to be without her cannon, however the alleged rumor regarded only the lighter D.551, for which there was proposed three types of armaments. The first was only the cannon, the second 5 light machine guns and the third 4 light machine guns.] 

So, Lt-Colonel Michel Marias (grp III/3) confirmed  the considerable relief he felt when he have got his first D. 520: 

"We managed to go somehow or other with our Morane until to the May 24, when we went to Toulouse-Cazaux to got our D.520. 

This time, our moral cheered up suddenly. This fighter was an outstanding one. 

The feeling that I had actually - that all of us had until that day - to be puppets at the enemy's mercy at last vanished". 


This opinion is close to that of Marcel Albert (grp I/3 "les chats" and, later, GC 3 / Normandie – Niemen in which he finished the War as second French ace with 23 victories - at least) :  

"The Dewoitine, with her four machine guns and her cannon, was an excellent fighter. They were pretty numerous at Toulouse, at Châteaudun, all over the place, but in the squadrons".

Vaclav Cukr (Czech – grp II/3) said : 

"The front line situation was critical... We thank the Destiny to have got the Dewoitine D.520. Each time we encounter Germans, the were two or three times more numerous as we were. Thanks to the Dewoitine, these first quality fighters, our losses were not too high..."

Some lines further, Vaclav Cukr underlined the powerful armament and the soundness of this aircraft, after having downed a Henschel 126 with one of his friends:

"Five Me 110 rushed at me. I don't know what happened thereafter, but I came back at home absolutely uninjured, and it was possible to count 127 holes of machine gun bullets and 2 from cannon shell."

About her maneuverability, some debates have been heard later. 

Their subject was the French overestimated the value of their actual best fighter - a question induced when one knows the overestimation of the Lioré-Olivier 451 bomber, and, worst, of the Morane-Saulnier MS 406 fighter. 

This subject need a complete post (click here).

{Sources: Most of the pilots testimonies of this post were published in the Icare review, in it series on La Chasse (#54, 55,145, 156).}

Evolution of the Dewoitine D.520 - (Corrected 09 / 09 / 2015)

Very often, I have read some papers about the wonderful planes the Nazis could possess if they were not defeated... 

The only little problem was that their defeat was absolutely unavoidable: 

• They had spent all the resources of all the countries they occupied, 

• they had lost several millions of their own soldiers, 

• they were under fire of the most powerful nations in the world and 

• their leaders had wasted all their diplomatic capacities. 

They had no choice at all.

The situation of the Dewoitine 520 mass production in June 1940

On the contrary, when Pétain imposed a cease fire to the French Armies, he had others choices, as Charles de Gaulle demonstrated it.

Yes, France suffered a huge defeat, but France could have continued the fight.

At the mid of June, 1940, after the excellent testing of the prototype, the Dewoitine plant was preparing the mass production of the Dewoitine D.523. 

This new fighter was a D.520 fitted with the Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 51 engine, yielding 1000 hp at altitude and 1100 hp for take off.


The first D.523 fighters were scheduled for July, before a lot of aerodynamic refinements could be applied to this aircraft, allowing to get more performances with the new power available.


At the same moment, the prototype of the D. 524 was prepared to her first flight with the Hipano Z engine.


The 3 tables displayed start from the real speed measurements on 3 different aerodynamic versions of the Dewoitine D.520. 

The others data of each table result from the computation of the speeds which would be reached by a given aerodynamic version with others engines.


The Hispano 12Y  was a very reliable engine (900 hours when used without heavy maintenance done in other place than the mother plant, as wrote Admiral Thabaut in the excellent Icare review).

The engines used in the operational D 520 were all built by Hispano-Suiza:

•     The 12 Y 31 delivered 860 hp  at  3250 m.

•      -    12 Y 29        -        920 hp at  3,600 m.

•      -    12 Y 45        -        920 hp at  4,200 m (S 39 supercharger)

•      -    12 Y 49        -        910 hp at  5,500 m (S 40 (?) supercharger)

•      -    12 Y 51        -      1000 hp at  4,200 m (S 39 supercharger)

•      -    12 Z             -      1200 hp at  4,750 m

Configuration I

The first fighter - the only one ready to be put into operational service - was the best choice for all the first year of the WWII, unfortunately, the rejection of the 100° octane fuel rejected her too. 

       Recorded speed with 920 hp:     527 kph      

 Estimated speed with 860 hp:       508 kph  

                 

Estimated speed with  950 hp:       532 kph  

Estimated speed with 1030 hp:     547 kph  

Table I - All results are given for an altitude of 5,000 m.

First configuration of the D.520 with a Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 29 engine - 

The results for 950 hp and 1030 hp are not related to any new engines but to the introduction of individual exhaust pipes for each cylinder in place of those gathering 2 successive cylinders (as for the Hawker Hurricane).

The D 520 with this engine could fight as easily against the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E than the D 520 S which was built, she was likely a bit more easy when flying close to the stall. 

The first production fighters could have been in operational squadrons before the first days of WWII. 

In such conditions, the number of fairly equipped squadrons could have been far superior for the May 10, 1940.

Configuration II

This configuration is the standard configuration of the series D 520 in 1940.

       Recorded speed with 920 hp:     535 kph         

 Estimated speed with 1,000 hp:      556 kph     

                 

Estimated speed with 1,100 hp:     560 kph    

Estimated speed with 1,200 hp:     585 kph    

Table II - aerodynamic configuration of the operational  D 520 S -

The first line displays the speed attained at 5500 m by the #2 D.520 exiting the production line .

All the other lines give the speed for an altitude of  5500 m

The value obtained for 1000 Cv are not far from the 562 kph of the Dewoitine D 523 (using a HS 12 Y 51 engine obtained in May 1940 by the famous test pilot Marcel Doret, 950 m above the critical altitude of the preceding version). 

Climbing times:

• 4000 m was reached in 5 minutes 5 seconds,

• 8000 m in 11 minutes 46 seconds.

For July or August 1940, such performances were very good. 

The first D 523 series fighters were scheduled to exit the assembly lines at July, 15, 1940.

Table II shows, also, how ridiculous were the assertions of French officials who claimed that the Morane 406 fighter needed only a more powerful engine to transcend the Bf 109 E fighter.  

With the Klimov (Hispano) M105P of 1100 Cv, the more aerodynamic Mörkö Morani reached only 525 kph, a value to compare to the 585 kph that a D.520 S could have reached with the same engine!

Configuration III

Table III displays the speed the D.520 #465 really reached with her aerodynamic refinements experimented in wind tunnel in Spring 1940 but experimented only in 1942-43 on the real fighter.

With a Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 51 engine, the speed could be of the same order than that of the Macchi 202.

       Recorded speed with 920 hp:    570 kph     

 Estimated speed with 1,000 hp:   588 kph

                 

   Estimated speed with 1,100 hp:   607 kph  

      Estimated speed with 1,200 hp:   625 kph     

      Estimated speed with 1,250 hp:    634 kph     
   

Table III - Third aerodynamic configuration of the Dewoitine 520 fighter -

- All the lines were computed for an altitude of 7000 m - The two last lines are a bit optimistic (which see). 

For the later period, the aerodynamic refinement of the D.520 - # 465 could, with more powerful engines, have given a very interesting fighter, matching with the best German ones, especially with the Bf 109 F.
                                                                                     

The 2 last speeds don't no take into account the 160 kg weight in excess of the 12 Z engine over the 12 Y 45/51 nor the significantly larger air intake of the liquid cooler. 

Nevertheless, it was possible to Hispano-Suiza to develop a more powerful variant of the HS 12 Y 51 able to deliver 1200 hp, as Klimov obtained with his M 105 used in the Yak 3 fighter.

It have been also discovered the more powerful engines needed an increase of the vertical part of the tail by 28 cm for a better control at slow speed. 

The Dewoitine engineers expected, at the take of weight of 3150 kg, a top speed of 660 kph at 9000 m. That speed imply a rather sophisticated air-supercharger.

The expected climbing times were:

•  4' 10" for 4000 m,

•  8' 00" for 8000 m,

• 14' 20" for 11000 m, the service ceiling being 12000 m.

The armament was expected to use 3 Hispano 404 canons.

The Dewoitine D.520 - Politics and proficiency in complete opposition (Enriched 26 / 11 / 2016)

Any human community having suffered an as great defeat as France experienced in 1940 must analyze thoroughly the reasons which had induced the actual situation. 

This lesson may be shared everywhere.

The example of the fighter Dewoitine D 520 outset seems a very good starting point for the understanding of the fantastic level of incompetence of the technical and the political deciders. 

Among the competences needed to be a politician decider, two are of paramount importance: Detecting the persons who have a true knowledge (independently from any lobbies) and detecting the exact time for action (to avoid the very frequent comment: too late). 

The deciders belonging to the last years of the French IIIème République seemed completely devoid of such competences. 

The Dewoitine 520-02, already a very good fighter

(The data used here have been published in the absolute reference book on this fighter: Le Dewoitine D.520, R. Danel et J. Cuny, Docavia N°4, ed. Larivière.)

The Dewoitine 520 fighter was one of the best fighters of her time. 

Both French politicians and administrative deciders have delayed her appearance on the field during more than 20 months since the end of 1936. 

So, she never reached the maturity achieved by fighters produced by other countries.

The last part of the delay (9 months) was related to the time needed to chose of her engines and of various other devices to be fitted on.

The first official data about the second prototype (D 520-02) were given in a report transmitted by the CEMA the March, 17, 1939.

This fighter was fitted with a Hispano-Suiza engine 12 Y 29 delivering 810 Hp at sea level and 920 Hp at 3,600 m. 

Her takeoff weight was 2,535 kg, giving a wing loading of 158.74 kg/m².

Her top speed was 527 kph at 5,000 m and the altitude of 8,000 m was reached in 13’45”. 

The deciders were OK for the ordering 200 Dewoitine fighters. Both the technical and tactical finalization of the D.520 were actually easy to reach.

The common sense was to build that fighter as she was during trials and the CEMA had no criticism about this fighter.  

Time wasting

French deciders, instead, wanted modifications, especially regarding the kind of engine. 

First, they chosen the Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 31 – the same fitted on the Morane 406 fighter – owing to its instantaneous availability and, mainly, because it did not need the 100° octane fuel (the 85 - 87 octan fuel was the one furnished to the Armée de Terre for its lorries and tanks!).

The 12 Y 31 engine had a power output of 760 Hp at sea level and of 860 Hp at 3,250 m. 

One can calculate the top speed will drop to 507 kph (loss of 12 kph due to the loss of 60 Hp and loss of 7 kph due to the loss of 350 m in altitude).

During the trials with a so-called 12 Y 31 engine in September 1939, the D 520 reached 550 kph at 5,200 m and climb to 8,000 m in less than 13 minutes.

Amazing ? No, clearly dishonest! 

The 12 Y 31 must have been seriously modified to obtain such a result ! 

• First, if the power is weaker, the speed decreases: It's a physical law. 

• Second, if the maxi altitude supercharger delivery is lower, the top speed cannot be obtained higher than with a supercharger able to deliver more power 350' higher!

{Parenthesis (26 11 2016): In the French aeronautical review "Les Ailes", published the January 12, 1939, it was written "the D 520 will be fitted with the Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 51 engines". 

Some weeks later, the same review gave an estimation of Marcel Doret about the top speed attainable by the D 520 with such an engine as 550 kph.

It's very likely that the CEMA used of this 12 Y 51 in the September 1939 trials, instead of the 12 Y 31. But, for some insane reason, they persisted to use of the wrong designation of this engine (some hand written texts showed confusing use of a 3 Arabic numeral in place of a 5 one)}

Even before these trials, the official deciders changed their decision again: They now needed another motor, the Hispano-Suiza 12 Y 45, which was similar to the 12 Y 29 but fitted with a much more modern supercharger (Szydlowski-Planiol S39 H3). 

This device used of a very refined internal aerodynamics, inducing a significant lengthening of the engine. 

The power output becomes 850 Hp at sea level and 920 Hp at 4,200 m.

Nobody, among all the distinguished deciders, had measured the length of the new motor with its new supercharger and the canon it was intended to carry!!! 

So, the total length of this package induced a 52 cm lengthening of the fighter. 

The weight of the plane increased to 2,650 kg and, may be, the D 520 was a bit less easy to fly at low speed.

Finally, the Dewoitine D 520 – during her trials of February 1940 - demonstrated :

• A top speed of 425 kph at sea level, 

•                           535 kph at 5,400 m,

•  A climb time to 4,000 m in   5’13”,  

•                        to 6,000 m in   7’57”

•                       to 8,000 m in 13’24”.

The brilliant result, after 9 months of "brain" storming (?), was a gain of 8 kph in top speed and 21” to reach the altitude of 8,000 m. LOL!

OK, this fighter was a very good fighter, equal to the best of her times.  


But the 9 months wasted to chose the best motor was catastrophic: If ordered and build as was the 02 prototype, the original D 520 (version 1) was able to be really operational since the Fall of 1939.

Her build time was 8,000 hours each.


With all her modifications, the technical and tactical finalization of the D 520 (version 2) was impossible before the May 10.

The deciders were under lobbies influence and have forgotten the lessons of Darwinian evolution: Competence is forged every day on the field of the realities, not in lounges, clubs or so on. 

French pilots and also French and Allied soldiers were killed owing the incompetence of these men !

I did not accept such behaviors for my country – but I did no more accept them for other countries, especially when they are friendly... 

The losses of Potez 63-11 reveal poor tactical choices (modified July 15, 2013)

The French observation / recce planes have suffered very heavy losses during the 40 days of the Battle of France. 

Especially the Potez 63-11 which was the main prey of the German fighters (376 losses - for any reasons - over 723 built).

Potez 63-11

A very interesting analysis has been published some years ago by Lt. Colonel F.R. Kirkland, of the US Air Force (in Air University Review, Sept.-Oct. 1985):
"Pilots in operational units wanted an ultrafast singleseater for long-range reconnaissance and a light two-seater capable of landing on unimproved fields for short-range observation missions. 
The air staff, preoccupied with political issues and indifferent to the views of men on squadron duty, ordered the Potez 63.11, the fastest, heaviest, most complex observation plane in the world. With a top speed of 264 miles per hour, it was 40 miles per hour faster than its German counterpart (Henschel Hs 126 B) and 50 miles per hour faster than the British Lysander. 
With twelve machine guns, it was the most heavily armed machine in any air force. 
Too fast and heavy to land on improvised strips yet too slow to escape German fighters, it was an elegant and graceful coffin for its crews."


My purpose today is to wonder about the relevance of some tactical concepts illustrated by the losses of the observations planes. 

French miltary deciders acting during the pre-War period were completely focalized on the speed of the planes that they want to buy (but for fighters...). 

They had forgotten that, at war, the success never relies on a single quality.

The strafing aircrafts punching the airfields

That was the first cause of losses I will discuss and it was the most avoidable: Dozens of planes were destroyed or heavily damaged this way. 


Concealment of the planes, or protecting them with merlons, were known solutions used by some fighter units (as, for example, the GC I/5 under the command of Cdt Murtin). 


Another solution could have been to put the observation squadron airfields far away from the front line. 


For the greedy Bf 109 E, a run increased by 200 km above the French territories could have been a bit problematic.


The last defense was, at last, the AA gun fire. 

However, our AA artillery soldiers were not thoroughly trained to such a fight, they were neither accustomed to plane recognition nor to the real gun fire on mobile target (it was the responsibility of the high ranking command, not of the soldiers).

The German Flak

That was the second cause of losses. 

Among the acknowledged 106 Potez 63-11 directly downed by the Germans, 50 were destroyed by AA fire, most of them by the awful 20 mm guns of the light Flak.

This Flak had almost completely forbidden to fly under the 2,000m (6,600 fts) level.

Potez 63-11 - An amazing replica build by Mr Garric in the USA as it appeared in 2009

If you are wondering why the French observation or recce planes flew at so uncomfortable altitude during the whole Battle of France, the first answer is: It was by orders of their Generals. 

The true answer might be found in the WWI practices:The observation and recce flights were not seen as different, the balloons were at risk, but the observers flying at a 2000' altitude were quite comfortable to see what they need to see. 

You can read my other blog, L'Aviation selon Drix, in French, to have an idea of the actual work from war letters of my own Grandfather André Delpey to my GrandMother, when he was photo analyst in a recce squadron (MF22) from the end of 1916 to the victory of 1918.

In 1939-1940, the men in command were all WWI veterans, chosen for their outstanding courage. 

But very few were fans of technology... 


The newborn WWII was completely different but only the young pilots were knowing that.


Using the Potez, the solutions were either to fly over that "light Flak ceiling" while using better optical devices to get good pictures or to fly at a more high level until the place to be observed was sufficiently close and to dive as fast as possible until 20 m AGL.

German fighters

The last cause of losses was obviously the Jagdwaffe, for which this job was absolutely critical.


Some French pilots or gunners have downed their ennemies. 

But, almost all of them perished in the final crash of their planes. 


Ok, the Potez, even in the 63-11 version, was very nimble.

But, also, the crews were very poor radio-users, they did not know the frequency to call for a fighter help. 

The escort by French fighters was quite impossible, as the more numerous available fighters were the Morane 406, which were slower than the Potez!

Criminal blindness

The most sad thing in this story is that the report delivered by these heroic men were rarely taken into account by their generals!

When an officer had reported, the May 12, that he had seen many tanks in the vicinity of Sedan, the staff officer of the 9th Army, of more high rank, answered him: "if the Germans were so close to Sedan, we were already knowing that !".

The lightweight fighter Caudron CR 714: Why such hatred? (enriched 12 / 08 / 2014)

About the Caudron-Renault company

The Caudron company had build a lot of biplane aircrafts during WW I and entered in the bigger Louis Renault company at the end of the 20's.

Louis Renault, a very skilled inventor and engineer, had chosen Marcel Riffard as the technical director of Caudron.

Marcel Riffard became quickly very famous when his racers won a lot of races, as the Deutsch de la Meurthe cup, before to win (with Michel Détroyat as pilot) the Greve Trophy and the Thompson Trophy in September 1936.


She was ordered very late, after mid-1938, and worst, she was never affected to a regular perfecting unit of the Armée de l’Air during the peace time. 

After the beginning of the Guderian’s Blitzkrieg, the Armée de l’Air affected the Caudron 714 fighter to the Polish Groupe de Chasse I/145. 

A bit too late…

A lightweight fighter

Impressed by the qualities of the Caudron racers, the French Air Staff opened the fighter contest defined by the program of 1934 to the lightweight fighters..

(Obviously, a lightweight fighter is defined by comparison with standard contemporary fighters. 

A PZL 11 fighter of 1933, with a fixed landing gear, a wooden fixed pitch air screw, an open cockpit and 2 riffle caliber machine guns, even if her take off weight was only 1650 kg, cannot be seen as a lightweight fighter: The contemporary standard fighter Dewoitine 500 - carrying 4 Darne machine guns - weighted 1710 kg.)

Facing a strong opposition from deciders 

The first prototype of this fighter was the Caudron CR 710, with a fixed landing gear. 

The Renault V 12 engine, at it initial step of development, yielded 420 hp but the fighter achieved 435 kph at altitude and climbed to 8,000 m in 18 minutes.

The CR 713 used a retractable landing gear and achieved 470 kph with her 450 hp engine.

The CR 714 appeared in 1938. 

(source :  les avions  Caudron-Renault, by Mihaly et Robinson, Docavia, 2001)

With a take off weight of 1713 kg, the performances were better :

• 390 kph at sea level,

• 476 kph at 4,500 m (480 kph at 5000 m),

• the climbing times being:

• 4,000 m ...   7'

• 5,000 m ...   9'

• 6,000 m ...  11' 22"

• 7,000 m ...  15'

• 8,000 m ...  20' 

• 9,000 m ...  29'12"

For all these data, nobody used the extra-power of the new Renault 12 R 03 yielding 500 hp for 3 minutes.

The fighters were rejected if their speed at 5,000 m was under 462 kph.

They were also rejected if the climb times were worse than 9' 40" to 4,000 m, 18' to 6,000 m and 30' to 8,000 m.

To use these data, please, remember that the top speed of all the Lioré & Olivier 451 bombers were spread from 462 kph to 498 kph.

In Spring 1940, during the mock up combat against the captured Bf 109 E, the Caudron demonstrated a clearly better maneuverability than her German enemy.

Some high level peoples (among those who had so much lobbied to choose the Morane-Saulnier 406 fighter…) predicted the complete failure of the Caudron fighter. 

More than 20 years later, the Chief Engineer Bonte wrote: “always during a war, the best fighter plane will be the most powerful one carrying the heaviest armament”. 

If Master Yoda, in another galaxy, far, far away, had known this arrogant man, I'm sure he would had say him: "So certain are you!" 

Perhaps, the 334 US pilots who were downed by the nimble Vietnamese Mig 17 or 21, 3 to 4 times lighter than their own plane, while flying their F 105 Thunder-chief (weighting up to 24 metric tonnes), did not share such an opinion? 

Their losses were even worst than the ones of the Potez 63-11 Recce plane during the Battle of France!

In action

Alone among all the lightweight fighters of the WW II, the Caudron CR 714 Cyclone reached the operational status during a true war time. 

Moreover, she fought the Luftwaffe she was intended to fight. 

However, the more robust and most interesting opinion is the one of Captain Laguna, the leader of the Polish unit. 

In the report he wrote when he was in Great Britain (thanks to Mathieu Comas who translated it to French in his book – les chasseurs Caudron CR 714, Avion, hors-série #11 ). 

For Capt. Laguna, the CR 714 was especially well designed and built. 


Nevertheless, he expressed strong regrets about the lack of detailed service manual and, worst, a total lack of spare parts.

This last point explaining perfectly how the number of available fighters was dwingling from a combat to the following one.

During the fighting of the GC I/145, M. Comas authenticated 10 victories, for the price of 3 pilotes KIA and one wounded. 


These victories have been obtained in 10 days, at the beginning of June 1940. 

It is absolutely not bad at all, contrarily as it was told everywhere : The best score of all MS 406 units was deserved by GC III/1, claiming 36 victories (after gathering all confirmed and unconfirmed victories). 

The 10 days rate of victories seems very similar (10 for the CR 714 / 9 for the MS 406), but its 8 victories obtained the May, 10, were on not escorted bombers. 

The conditions between the June 2 and June 12 were much more dramatic ! 

So, the CEMA beloved Morane fighter, in a good fighter group, with a much more steady strength, did not obtain better results than the constantly vilified Caudron Cyclone.

One may wonder about the reason why the Caudron was never used by any regular French unit. 

If it had be done, this fighter could be better known, more reliable and the spars would have been collected in sufficient amount.

My only technical regret regards the weapons fitted in this plane – four 7.5 mm machine guns, gathered in a voluminous “suitcase” in each wing – even though a couple of 0.5 cal. Browning would have given a longer range and a much stronger punch (as also a significantly better speed). 

In such a case, the Cyclone fighter could obtain very much striking results !

My personal opinion is the Caudron Cyclone, once finalized, could have been a very better fighter than the Morane MS 406.