The Defiant: An obsolete concept annihilated a promising fighter (Revised 18 / 09 / 2023 * ***)

[The data I'd used are mainly issued from the complete book of fighters of W. Green & G. Swanborough and from the En. Wikipedia]

The two-seat, single engined fighter? An idea stemming from WWI...

During WW I, British engineers have developed successfully a single engined two-seat fighter, the Bristol F2B, which was also successful operationally.

This fighter was powerful, nimble and very fast for its times.

So, she was able to fulfill recce missions as, also bombing  and, obviously, fighting missions.

Such an idea was very relevant in 1916: Then, the fighters were had a not very good flight stability. So, a good gunner could be a very good asset.


The best fighters (as actually was, e.g., the Nieuport 11) were using rotary air cooled engines. When you read about these fighters were outstandingly maneuverable, it's not absolutely true.

In the "good direction" of turn, yes, they were absolutely perfect.

However, in the opposite direction, the gyroscopic effect of the engine rotation was such that the fighter must do a complicated maneuver to obtain a good firing place...

So, the defending gunner had a good chance and all the needed time to down the enemy fighter (except if he was fighting men such as René Fonck or Albert Ball).

The concept revival begin in 1935 in the British Air Ministry with its specification 9/35.

May 1940 in France? A completely different context! 

The Aviation of 1935, nevertheless, was completely different!

The recent aircrafts were reliable, very easy to fly, they fly incredibly faster... The Aviation was mature.

But, for fighter planes, actually, the most important quality to be achieved was the best possible aerodynamics.

To a structural point of view, the old structures were made with steel tubes, wooden spars and were covered with fabric.

That was easy to repair everywhere (especially in a huge colonial Empire) but unable to withstand all the constraints induced by very high speed.

On the contrary, the all-metal monocoque structures, with their stressed skin, were lighter, much more aerodynamically efficient, and, also, more resistant against riffle caliber machine gun fire.

The powered turret build by Boulton Paul was based on a French license of the SAMM and have been successfully tested of the biplane bomber Overstrand. Nevertheless, that was too heavy (at least 500 kg without the gunner).

The two contenders

The Defiant, conceived by the Boulton-Paul staff, was the first contender for a twoseats, single engined fighter to fly, the August 11, 1937. 

Boulton Paul Defiant - the turret is facing an aircraft flying above the one of the photograph.

She had an up-to-date all-metal stressed skin monocoque structure similar to that of the Spitfire MK I.

Powered by the same Rolls-Royce Merlin III than the Spitfire, she was heavier: The empty aircraft weighted 2760 kg (100 kg more than the take off weight of the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E).

The normal take off weight was 3800 kg and the wing area was 23.5 m², near from that of the Spitfire Mk I.

Obviously, her larger weight induced a reduced maneuverability when compared to a Spitfire.

The electro-hydraulically powered turret was broader than the fuselage, inducing clear losses in fineness.

So, the Boulton-Paul designers had conceived aerodynamic fairings pneumatically powered to minimize the speed losses (but notably increasing the weight).

With her turret installed, the Defiant achieved:

• a top speed of 490 kph at 5,200 m, 

• 8' 30" to climb to 4,600 m (a poor performance similar to that of the poor Morane-Saulnier 406...),

• a service ceiling of 9,200 m.

The flying qualities were good.

However, this fighter suffered from her complete lack of frontal armament as, also, of any gun sight for the pilot (!).

Such a decision was silly.


The other contender was the Hotspur and stemming from the unsuccessful light bomber  Hawker Henley.

Her design used the old and heavier structural solutions used in the Hurricane (with all the same shortcomings).

Her maiden flight occurred in mid-June, 1938, 10 months after the Defiant.

She was powered by the same Rolls-Royce Merlin III engine yielding 1030 hp.

Her empty weight was 2630 kg and the take off weight 3470 kg.

Her wing area was ~32 m², very similar to the wing area of the French ground strike twin-engined bomber Potez  631.

Hawker Hotspur  - Ok, you can see a turret (not streamlined at all!), but it's not a Boulton-Paul one, and there was no weapon fitted on

The Hotspur was said lighter than her competitor, a very amazing statement, because she can be seen as a Henley - weighting 3,850 kg for take off - with the addition of a powered turret of 4 machine-guns.

The horizontal speed at altitude, tested at Martlesham, appeared better than those of the Defiant and, for a scientific observer, that was, at least, very amazing too!

• The published top speed was 510 kph, 

• 10' 30" were needed to reach 4,600 m,

• The service ceiling was 8,200 m.

The top speed was identical to that of the Hurricane Mk I prototype (KL 5083)! 

My personal opinion is that such performances were absolutely impossible to reach by the actual prototype.

Ok, the Hawker's new baby was said as 300 kg lighter than her competitor, nevertheless she was 570 kg heavier than the operational Hurricane Mk I and ~900 kg heavier than the initial Hurricane K 5083 with which she must be compared.

Moreover, the aerodynamic capacities of the Hotspur were not good at all: 

• The turret was not streamlined at all.

• The wings aspect ratio  - 4.78 - was bad, compared to the 6.19 of the Defiant or the 6.21 of the Hurricane

• The thick wings displayed no thinness at all.

• Having in recollection the Hurricane K 5083 story, the Hotspur weight was 300 kg below the real one, owing some outrageous minimizing of her ballasts.

All these evidences were convergent to suspect some fake created to give a better picture of the Hawker technology.

I suspect the true top speed of the Hotspur was, at least, clearly inferior to that of the Defiant.

William Green wrote in his book that no real competition was organized between the two contenders. 

It is said, to and fro, that the hard work to produce the Hurricane explained the weak competition spirit of the Hawker's engineers. 

May be, it was one among some fairy tales used to deceive the German deciders about the true performances of the Hurricane. 

The first time Adolf Galland fought against Hurricane, as he wrote in his memories, he seemed very disappointed by the weakness of the British fighter...

At the time of the Defiant production started, Sydney Camm, chief engineer of Hawker, was starting a very long and hard way to be able to create really fast fighters.

He was designing the pretty but defective Tornado, which was later modified in the better Typhoon, before to obtain the very good Tempest and a bit too late, the superlative Fury.


But, as for the false top speed of the French Morane 406 fighter, it would be better to told us the truth.

 

A British wasted chance

During the Fall of 1939, after dogfights opposing Hurricane to Defiant, all resulting in defeats for the two-seater,  Boulton-Paul staff engineers become aware of the wrong conception of his fighter.

They removed the turret and all things needed to accept a second crew member from the prototype to test the Defiant as a single seat fighter (project P 94). 

The P 94 could see her weight dropping to ~3100 kg, enabling a good maneuverability and boosting her climbing speed.

William Green wrote in Famous Fighters of WWII (in 1960) that the performances were "marginally better" than that of the Hurricane, but, in En. Wikipedia, you may found the expected top speed was 580 kph! 

Knowing that, as also the fact that more than 1,000 Defiant were built during the first year of WWII, it is tempting to imagine the tactical weight of the reinforcement obtained by the Fighter Command with the transformation of 500 Defiant in their P94 variant. 

But the British Government preferred to sent his courageous pilots in their obsolete Hurricane.

It was not a wise decision.

Inappropriate tactics!

CJ Ehrengardt wrote in his review Aéro-Journal hors série #7, Spitfire sur l'Europe, that Sir Hugh Dowding had incredible difficulties to obtain more Spitfire and Hurricane from the administration of the Air Ministry who want an all Defiant Fighter Command...

Anyway, if these Defiant have been in France, as they were, the May 10, 1940 in the morning, when most of the numerous German bomber raids were unprotected, the losses of German bombers could have been very heavier.

Moreover, some of these fighters, associated with Hurricane flying as high cover, could have given a good protection for the hopeless Fairey Battle during their heroic missions in Belgium and in France. 

For their first combat, the Defiant squadrons have encountered the Luftwaffe over Dunkirk.
They worked very efficiently against bombers.

Obviously, fighting the Messerschmitt was a completely different task for them.

Some initial success occurred, thanks to the surprise of the German pilots unprepared to facing such a rear defense from what they identified as a single seat fighter.

However, each time the Defiant pilots forget their peculiar weapon layout and as long they were staying at altitude, the German Bf 109 attacked them from beneath - without hazard for them - and downed the Defiant.

 During one mission, for example, for 9 Defiant sent, 7 were downed this way...

The only successful defense method was a quick spiraling descent until some meters above the ground level, forbidding any attack from beneath. This being followed by a defensive (or Lufberry) circle.

An famous over-claim of 38 German planes (!) downed was recorded at a day during which only 14 aircrafts were lost by the Luftwaffe over the complete front lines! 

The weapons lay out: In opposite way to the Fighting Spirit

The Defiant cannot be used as the fighter pilots were trained to proceed, a huge mistake of the deciders.

First, they were not fitted with a gun-sight to fire frontally (even it was possible to turn the turret to the bow while transferring the firing commands to the pilot).

However, it should be clear to any decider the pilot was the only people to have a clear view on the aerial situation.

To steer optimally his fighter in a favorable fire place, he needed a really strong telepathic link with his gunner!

I wonder how this peoples who wrote, after the war, a lot of books about the situation awareness – a very useful concept, indeed - might have invented a so perfect situation blindness...

So, it is impossible for me to give an assessment about the efficiency of the Defiant concept.

But her pilots and crew displayed their great courage.

The lesson was not still understood for the Battle of Britain, were the stress of the pilots was much heavier.

So, the Defiant were only used to the night fighting where they appeared better than all other British planes, probably because the turret playing the role of the famous schrägeMuzik of the German night fighters.

This story is a proof  that never the Aerial Fight can be summarized to any appealing concept (as the USAF will, may be, discover with the stealth one).

From the other hand, while reading in the William L. Shirrer’s Berlin Diary the report of his visit on the beach of Dunkirk, he was told by a young German fighter pilots that the Defiant was “terrific”!

The failure of the Defiant was even worst than that of the Morane–Saulnier 406 - which may be helped by a clearly better maneuverability than the one of the Bf 109 E - but, as in the case of the French fighter, the aeronautic administration was the great devil...

The jailed French fighters of May 10, 1940 (revised 11 / 08 / 2014)

A very amazing method to prevent the fighters from any free move...

It's time for me to criticize the geographic anchoring of the main part of the French squadrons during the Battle of France - not only during the peace time, but also during the war time.

Obviously, at war, every thing that is able to fly must be seen as movable.

The anchoring was based on splitting of the expected front line territories into 4 regions christened respectively :

• Zone d'Opération Aérienne Nord (ZOAN), 
• Zone d'Opération Aérienne Est (ZOAE),
•  Zone d'Opération Aérienne Sud (ZOAS), 
• Zone d'Opération Aérienne des Alpes (ZOAA). 

Each of these Zones being subdivided in smaller subdivisions or Groupements, each one gathering several groupes de chasse (GC) with 2 to 3 squadrons of 12 fighters each. 

At least, a very complicated structure! 

The biggest of these Groupements were under the lead of a general, the weakest ones being led by a colonel.

Personal collection of the author. The 2 most important aerial zones at the May, 10, 1940 - This map was published in Icare - 1939-40 / la Bataille de France, Vol. IV, La Reconnaissance, paper of R. Danel - p 80 / 81 

This geographical organisation was a clear fossil of the artillery organisation at the beginning of 1918, when the observation planes were unable to fly far from their airfield. 

On the picture above, you can see the boundaries of the terrestrial armies.

The wide spreading of the French fighters, even far out of France

The largest one (ZOAN) faced the main boundary of Belgium. Verdun was the East most city of this zone

The Groupement 21 (general Pinsard) had 152 single engined fighters, the Groupement 25 had 50 and the Groupement 23 had 183 fighters (general Romatet).

Altogether, these 3 Groupements gathered 385 single engined fighters as also 24 Potez 631 for the Aéronavale and 47 other similar twin-engined fighters for night fighting. 

The BEF (British Expeditionary Force) was also embedded in this zone. 


The second zone (ZOAE) faced mainly the boundary with Germany and gathered 245 fighters.

Together, these two Zones had 630 single engined, single seat French fighters to which you must add the British fighters.


Significantly less than the forces dedicated by the Luftwaffe to attack the Allied aerial forces.

The third Zone was the Alpes Zone, facing Italy and gathering 145 fighters, among them the only one able to match the Messerschmitt Bf 109E: The GC I/3 with thirty-six Dewoitine D.520! 

But, also, 135 other Morane 406 were outside of France, as far as 1500 to 3000 km from the true front line: Some inside North Africa, some inside Lebanon (among them a very good unit, the GC I/7). 

These 910 fighters could have been gathered in the French Front zone! 

It was the solution the common sense seemed to command.

In such a case, the Luftwaffe - involved also in Poland, near the new soviet boundaries, Norway and Danemark - would have experienced very heavier losses from the beginning of the German offensive and may had some difficulties for backing so efficiently the breakout of the Guderian's Schwerpunkt!

But the problem was not only geographic. 

It was worst!

All French fighters, as also the French bombers, were under command of officers who cannot at all have a good and complete situation awareness.

So, they never had any strategic sight, this explaining they did not send all the Allied bombers against the German column at the very morning of the May 12, 1940 in the Ardennes.

Such emergency strikes could have been lethal for the armored divisions of general Guderian.

If the problem was to give jobs to old generals, some alternatives existed...

For these generals, there was a lot of work to do:

• hardening the airfields against enemy air strikes;                 

• training the pilots to efficient firing against nimble target;

• organizing better and easier radio-communications;     

• improving the too slow training of young pilots;

• creating quick and reliable communications between all different French forces;

• developing the analysis of all kind of radio-detection systems; 

• gathering the data of the alert system and sent quickly the relevant ones to the competent units;

• sending the analysis of the informations given by the recce units to the bombing units;

• organizing the delivery of new planes in airfields not too far from the front; 

• organizing a true aerial transport command.

At the end of March 1940, 140 Dewoitine D.520 have been finished by the SNCAM plants. 

Indeed, that amount was sufficient to create 10 squadrons, with considerably better punching capacities than the Morane equiped ones, even they were not absolutely complete. 

OK, these D 520 were lacking 15 kph of their top speed, but as they were, they flew 70 kph faster than the Morane 406. 

That is the reason that makes me angry against the men who, irresponsibly, maintained the fiction of a top speed of 486 kph reached by the Morane fighters. 

The real difference of performances with the D. 520 was not 44 kph, but 80 to 90 kph!


I share a great part of the opinions published in 1985 by Lt. Colonel Farris R Kirkland of the USAF. 

The defeat of the French Air Force cannot so easily be attributed to the sole Luftwaffe.

The Hurricane Mk I, the first efficient British fighter over the French front line in May 1940 (Enriched / Modified 18/ 09 / 2023 ***)

The main British aerial defender of the first year of WW II

The first fighter sent to France, at the outbreak of WWII, was the completely obsolete Gloster Gladiator, with her unimpressive top speed of 400 kph at 4350 m (!) and her climb speed of 4' 30" to achieve 3,000 m. 

She cannot be seen as a serious contributor to the defense of the Allied front lines in France, as, e.g. she was clearly unable to make serious escort duty for the Fairey Battle bombers.

So, after only one full week of waiting, the first Hurricane squadron landed during the Fall of 1939, followed by three squadrons, and some weeks later, by two more.

The Hawker K. 5083 prototype

It's not easy to have an good idea of the performances of the Hawker Hurricane Mk I during the Phoney War as during the Campaign of France. 

The reason is the striking enhancements of performances obtained by the British fighters after the Allied defeat of June 1940, to overcome the known shortcomings in performances before the Battle of Britain. 

Especially, her two blade propeller was not well suited to achieve good performances. 

A similar, but less radical, evolution happened in the Luftwaffe at the same time.

But, if you want to understand the Campaign of France, you need to obtain the actual performances of all aircrafts. 

To give you an idea about what was the current performances of the 1936 prototypes, the Curtiss P 36 flew at 450 kph, the Polikarpov I 16 at 420 kph and the Morane-Saulnier 405 at 435 kph.

For his new fighter, Sydney Cam, the Hawker chief engineer, had conceived a straightforward evolution of the Hawker Fury biplane fighter, eliminating the biplane structure substituted by a large low-wing cantilever monoplane one.

He chosen an easy-to-repair structure, with a steel tube Warren structure, the wooden stringers being fabric covered: A structure perfectly suited to colonial duties. 

Nevertheless, the more modern prototypes, as the Messerschmitt Bf 109 V1 or the Nieuport 161 (as also the Bloch 150 and the later Dewoitine 520) were all conceived as stressed skin all-metal monocoques, a much lighter structure. 

Mr. Cam chosen also to raise the cockpit, a good idea for the pilot's sights, but not for aerodynamics (because of the increased cross section it induced).


The initial flying performances of the prototype of the Hurricane appeared very good in April 1936.

The Hurricane K 5083 had a take off weight of 2573 kg and her Rolls-Royce Merlin C delivered 1029 hp at 3400 m.

This aircraft was pleasant to fly, able to tight turns.

Her top speeds were:

• 407 kph at sea level,

• 505 kph at 4500 m (15,000 ft),

•  454 kph at 9100 m (30,000 ft).

The climb speed were good too:

•   5'           to reach circa 4000 m,

• 13' 30"   ------------  circa 8000 m.

At this very moment, she was the fastest fighter of the World!

After some extension to the lower part of the rudder to obtain a better spin behavior, the Hurricane was ordered in production.

The warrior Hurricane Mk I

The Hurricane involved in the WWII in France was very different. 

Lately, she had got stressed skin all-metal wings, which allowed her a 130 kph increase in diving speed (a perfect illustration of the better suitability of the stressed skin for a fighter!).

She had got also some armor plates and, at last, her full armament of 8 machine guns with 500 rounds each.

Some of these Hurricane were fitted with a 2 pitch De Havilland propeller (not all, unfortunately).

Early production Hurricane MkI with a 2 blade fixed pitch propeller and ejector exhaust pipes. 

The top speed of this fighter was 515 kph at 5300 m (even if, in 1940, the review Flight published frequently a speed of 335 mph, that was better for the mood of British peoples).

The climbing speed was :

• 6' 30" for 4,500 m,

• 9' 50" for 6,000 m.

The 3' 20" needed to climb the last 1500 m told us this fighter can hardly climb to 8,000 m in less than 15'.

The Hurricane had now a take off weight of 2,900 kg, and the added 315 kg have forbidden better performances.

Nevertheless, the actual performances were undoubtedly better than those of the Curtiss H 75 and of the Morane 406.

Her landing speed was less than 100 kph and the wide track of her landing gear enabled easy landing.

A pilot opinion

Many things were wrote by English pilots about that fighter. 

But, it's very difficult to eliminate some political bias which may be founded in some one.

It was obviously normal to highlight the most numerous fighter of the Battle of Britain. 

However, in 1940, she was not the superlative fighter described by William Green in his book Famous Fighter of WWII.


So, the only pilot opinion I will retain is that of René Mouchotte, Free French pilot who escape North Africa to join the combat with De Gaulle at the end of June 1940. 

He was a very skilled pilot, he love absolutely the Great Britain, and wrote his Carnets only for himself. 

So, his opinion is absolutely fair.

He was one of the few French involved in the Battle of Britain (and was killed when leading the Biggin Hill Wing in September 1943).

In the Armée de l'Air, previously, he was very happy with the MS 406, doing easily aerobatics at very low level above ground level.


In the RAF, piloting the Hurricane, he praised very much her speed. Then, he forget completely the Morane fighter (demonstrating how slow flying was the MS 406...).

Against the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E, he praised the tighter turning ability of the British fighter.


Embedded, at last, in the Churchill squadron, he appeared a bit disappointed. 

His criticism regarded the top horizontal speed because the bombers are difficult to catch.

(this may be seen as a confirmation of Air Chief Marshall Dowding revealed very later: 

The average top speed of the Hurricane during BOB was only 304 mph - 490 kph - 25 kph slower than it was told to the peoples).

Also, he did not like the too weak climbing ability, enabling the Bf 109 E to down so easily his team mates.

Some time later, his mood became positive again when he piloted the brand new Hurricane II A, but it was too late, in 1941...

In action

It's not easy to determine accurately the real efficiency of the Hurricane against the Luftwaffe.

The best documented data are those of the BoB, but the Hurricane used in Summer and Fall 1940 were absolutely better than those of the Campaign of France : 

• They used 100 octane gas, allowing a far greater climbing speed (8' 24" to reach 6,000 m), owing to the 250 hp more powerful engine (for 5'). 

• The Rotol constant speed air-screw allowed both a better top speed and a much better climbing ability (nevertheless, the Fleet Air Arm preferred the much more lighter de Havilland propeller). 

All currently published data for the Hurricane Mk I are those of this last variant..

{German fighters were, also, upgraded, but with less efficiency. 

The DB 601 engine delivering 1050 Hp during the Campaign of France was able to deliver 1,175 Hp for BoB (+ 125 hp).}



Anyway, the grand total of German losses during the Battle of Britain was 1,887 (German sources) or 2,739 (Fighter Command sources). 

According to RAF, 55% of these victories were obtained by Hurricane.

This fighter was the most numerous British one: About 2/3 of the total number of single engined fighter belonged to the Fighter Command (e.g., the August, 17, 1940, the Fighter Command had 675 Hurricane and 378 Spitfire). 

Comparing the great Hurricane number (ratio among the single seat fighters : 65%) to the ratio of their victories (55%) suggest a clear lack of fighting efficiency of the Hurricane compared to the Spitfire one. 

An abnormal flaw

During he Campaign of France, which lasted only 14 days for most of the British fighter squadrons, the published Hurricane losses were 386, that may be translated in 27.6 Hurricane destroyed per each day! 

On the other hand, during the 100 days long Battle of Britain, 538 Hurricane were downed (5.38 for each day), an amazingly low number. (The Hurricane downed 1,038 German aircrafts, an average of 10 per day.)

One may rely the heavy losses during the French campaign to a great flaw which originated in the mounting of a central tank, a flaw discovered when, in 31 days (10 July-11 August) the fire of the German rear gunners hit 25 Hurricanes and 25 Spitfires, inducing 2 Spitfires downed vs 11 Hurricanes downed. 

This flaw was discovered when it appeared that the central fuel tank, just in front of the pilot, was absolutely unprotected. The reason given was it was a too small a target!

The honorable deciders should think that the main target for a gunner was the pilot himself, so all flammable objects in the vicinity of this pilot was a source of additional danger.

After this, this tank was secured with Linatex coating... 

Personal data of the author (adapted from Flight, 1938)- The unprotected tank was just in front of the pilot!

The hard lessons of a new war...

If the RAF had accepted the replacement of 2 riffle caliber machine-guns by two 20 mm cannons, as it was suggested very early by Sydney Cam, the results could have been much more dramatic for the Luftwaffe (as it was operationally confirmed a full year later...).

Attacked only with riffle machine-gun fire, the German bombers might be seen as complicated traps. 
They were tough and there gunners were very well trained.
Being attractive for the eyes of the British fighter pilots, they might allow, some times, deadly rearward attacks from their escort fighters.


The efficiency of the Hurricane fighters and of their pilots during BoB cannot be separated from their role during the Campaign of France:

Their pilots had learned perfectly the tactics of the Jagdwaffe, the performances of its fighters and the flying patterns of the Luftwaffe.

A lot of these impressive pilots were transferred to Spitfire squadrons and they performed very well. 

The Spitfire, star of the Dynamo operation (may be...) and of the Battle of Britain (certainly) (revised 16 / 05 / 20187)

Superlative Spitfire...

It's really difficult to know exactly the performances of the Hawker Hurricane fighter operationally used during the 20 days of her Campaign of France.

Probably for ancient reasons of secrecy, all fans of fighters of this periods may experience the same difficulties to know the exact performances of the prototype of the Spitfire - K 5054 - during her early months of flying.

Anyway, the aerodynamic conception of this fighter was excellent, especially with her very thin wings for its times (relative thickness at 12.5%). 

Nevertheless, the sentence "Don't touch anything" attributed to her first test pilot after the first flight, the March 10, 1936, was only war - or pre-war - propaganda.

Such a policy was fair facing the high level of the Nazi propaganda. 

Today, such a sentence is completely obsolete.

Yes, this fighter was very well conceived.


Obviously, the perfecting of the Spitfire was long, as was the one of any other successful fighters in the World. 

The development team was very efficient, even after the death of RJ Mitchell.

She was a good symbol of the British war industry. 

Learning the Art of making Speed!

(all following data were found in this excellent site http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-I.html)

But, as promising was the K 5054, she was very far from the efficient fighter she will became to be.

The first top speed to have been reached at altitude - probably in April 1936 - was 528 kph with a take off weight of 2400 kg (= without any additional weight representing armament).

One month later (in May) a much more sophisticated air-screw - but using always a fixed pitch one - allowed a speed of 557 kph, 50 kph above the top speed achieved by the Hawker Hurricane. 


The climbing speed, also, was good:

•   5' 40" to reach 15,000 ft (~4500 m),

• 17' 00" to reach 30,000 ft, the same order of magnitude than the climbing performances of the Hurricane K 5083. 

So, the British government ordered 310 Spitfire, an almost wise decision (I will go back soon on this important subject in last part of the section entitled: Any shortcoming?).

A bit later, the Spitfire was fitted with ejector exhaust pipes, allowing her 16 kph more in top speed.

Such performances, as also the good flying characteristics she demonstrated, impacted all aeronautical military deciders in all European countries. 

For example, it was likely the reason for which the Luftwaffe deciders urged the fitting of the Daimler-Benz DB 601 on the Messerschmitt Bf 109.

The early operational variants 

The first production Spitfire were very late, that resulting from two reasons. 

The first one was the time needed to build a single Spitfire: About 17,000 hours, twice the value needed for a Messerschmitt Bf 109 E!

It could had been not a problem if the Vickers staff had launched the mass production of the Spitfire in the Supermarine plant. 

Instead, they preferred to build a brand new plant involving car industry worker... and they continue to assemble the Walrus flying-boats instead...

So, when WWII started, the RAF had got only 200 Spitfire! 

That was only 40% of the Hurricane production (500), and 20 % of the Fairey Battle production (1000), an aircraft using very similar structural technical methods! 

This version was designated as the Spitfire Mk I. 

Spitfire I bis - The windshield is an armored one, so the air-screw may be a Rotol constant speed. 

Thie first operational Spitfire had a take off weight of 2625 kg, 200 kg more than the K 5054.

This version, tested during the last days of 1938, was the version used by the RAF during the beginning of WWII.

Her top speeds with the wooden fixed pitch air-screw were:

• 460 kph at sea level,

• 580 kph at 5,600 m,

• 505 kph at 9,000 m.

The climbing speeds were:

• 6' 30" to reach 15,000 ft, performance corresponding to: 

• circa 5' 30" to reach 4,000 m,

• circa 7' 20" to reach 5,000 m,

• 22' 20" to reach 9,000 m (6 min more than the K 5054).

The service ceiling was 9,600 m.

Some few months later, a new 2 pitch metal air-screw was fitted on the Spitfire, whose weight reached 2,700 kg (275 kg more than the take off weight of K 5084).

The take off and landing runs were shorter. 

The top speed was 590 kph, a slight progression, and the climbing speed was not bad, knowing that the aircraft was significantly heavier than the version fitted with the wooden fixed pitch propeller. 

(trials of the July 12, 1939, Martelsham Heath)

•   5' 30"  to reach    10,000 ft (3,000 m), 

•   8' 06" ------------    15,000 ft (4,500 m),

• circa 7' 16" ------------ 4,000 m,

•   8' 54" --------------- 16,500 ft (circa 5,000 m),

• 11' 25" --------------- 20,000 ft (circa 6,000 m),

• 17' 12" --------------- 26,000 ft (circa 7,900 m),

• 22' 00" --------------- 29,000 ft (circa 9,000 m).

She performed sufficiently well to impress her enemy pilots. 

I suspect this variant to be the most numerous involved in the Dunkirk air battles.


However, no more than 2 months later, during the Battle of Britain, the Spitfire became a completely different beast!

Fitted with a Rotol constant speed air-screw and using 100° octane fuel (allowing more boost pressure), the engine yielded 1,310 Hp during 5 minutes boost.

The take-off weight increased (at least) up to 2,750 kg.

The top speed was rather slightly reduced (570 kph) but the climbing speeds became very, very better:

•   4' 40"  to reach  4,000 m (gain of 3 min),

•   6' 00"    --------   5,000 m (gain of 3 min),

•   7' 42"    --------   6,000 m (gain of 3 min 30"),

• 11' 50"    --------   8,000 m (gain of 5 min 30"),

•  16' 25"   --------   9,000 m (gain of 5 min 30").

The service ceiling was 10,600 m  (gain of 1,000 m).

The new version performed very well, even above 6,000 m, and was a true challenge for the German fighter pilots.

The clear difference between all the previous variants and the latest suggest to designate this one as the Spitfire Mk I bis (oops, I'm so sorry!).

 This version impressed very strongly Adolph Galland...

Any shortcoming?

Of course, the Spitfire, as all fighters, was not perfect.

A first problem was highlighted by Louis Bonte in his Histoire des Essais en Vol (Docavia #3, 1974). He acknowledged the good flying qualities of the British fighter, but he feel the ailerons too heavy at high speed. 

So, he favored the Curtiss H75 - P 36 - which had the considerably more important shortcoming of being 100 km/h slower.

This problem was re-discovered by Jeffrey Quill when he fought during the Battle of Britain. 

After 3 days in a squadron (and 2 victories!), he have seen the fabric skin of the ailerons ballooning at high speed. 

Replacing the fabric by metal sheets solved the problem.


A second problem was too light armament: The 8 machine guns with 300 rounds each were insufficient against the German bombers.


But, when two Hispano-Suiza HS 404 20 mm cannons were fitted in the wings (Spitfire I B), they jammed quickly. 

One may relate this problem to the very thin (and light) structure of the wing. 

This problem was solved, more than one full year later, with the type C wing, also dubbed universal, in the Spitfire V.

A more important shortcoming resulted from the very long building time need for a single Spitfire: 17,000 hours, to compare with the 10,500 hours for a Hurricane or the 8,000 hours for a Messerschmitt Bf 109 E.

It would had no such pernicious effect if Vickers had accepted to start the mass production directly with the Supermarine plant. 

But Vickers preferred to product Walrus light amphibious flying boat... No comment!

So, Supermarine needed 2 years to deliver the first operational fighters. 


Knowing the fact that only 200 Spitfire were operational at the outbreak of WW II versus 500 Hurricane, one may dream about what happens if there were 500 Spitfire and 500 Hurricane at that very moment!

The worst shortcoming ? In the Command's mind!

Usual British sources told us that Lord Dowding, who was actually Air Chief Marshall, in command of the Fighter Command, had refused to send his Spitfire in France to fight the Luftwaffe. 

May be, such a fairy tale is true, may be it's not...

The British democracy, as we know her, give the full power of decision to the government. 

It would be amazing that the Prime Minister, especially Winston Churchill, accepted such a decision issued from a "simple" chief of staff...

Anyway, the choice appears now as not so relevant as it was relentlessly repeated by British medias since 1940.

The counter-example of the Hurricane squadrons

The Hurricane squadrons fought gallantly in France against an overwhelming enemy. 

So, their pilots learned all the ways they can use efficiently their fighters.

They also developed a very impressive proficiency and very adequate tactics. 

During the Battle of Britain, they obtained significantly more victories than the Spitfire pilots notwithstanding to their clearly inferior fighters.

They better know their fighters than the Spitfire pilots and they can interpret faster the tactic situation of the combat.

Too much losses of the Spitfire 

On the contrary, during the Dynamo operation over Dunkirk, the Spitfire pilots discovered the German Messerschmitt 109 E. 

At that historical step, the Spitfire pilots were completely inexperienced: A very asymmetric situation when facing German pilots issued from the Spanish civil war, the Polish war and the combats against French and British pilots since May 10 in the French skies.

Fortunately for the British pilots, the German was not very proficient in aircraft recognition, so, for them, all fighter tagged with the British roundels could have been wrongly identified as Hurricane! 

So, the German losses were higher than expected. 

But the results of the Dunkirk Battle was not very good for the Spitfire (42 downed in 4 days), taking into account the very quality of the British fighter.

The Spitfire pilot's problem was not solved when the Battle of Britain started!

The proof is given by the losses of British fighter during July 1940: 67 British fighters were downed. Among them, 33 Hurricane and 34 Spitfire. 

We know the number of Hurricane was at least twice the number of Spitfire, such an equality suggests us the Spitfire was a very bad fighter, compared to the Hurricane. 

Obviously, this reasoning is wrong, so the unique solution is the pilots were insufficiently experienced. 


Oh, yes, you may answer me the Spitfire (flying since 4 years and in mass production since 2 years) was not completely finished. 

But, even with his not perfectly finished Spitfire, Mr. Jeffrey Quill was able to fight very efficiently during his very short operational time!

A chance point?

Using some Spitfire squadrons in France would have had a huge influence on the events, depending from the amount of fighters involved.


First, the Spitfire pilots would have learned perfectly in time the best methods to attack and destroy the enemy Bf 109 E.

Second, used in large number, they could give to the French artillery in the Sedan theater an efficient cover, disabling most of the Stuka threats.

So, the Campaign of France could not be the huge failure she was...


The real decision to conserve this munificent fighter at home induced a lot of losses among the British pilot's lives.


Luckily, the superiority of the Spitfire on the Hurricane was such that even the Hurricane II was used for other purposes than true fighting.

Luckily, the British ground control was, also, excellent.

That was very lucky, because, just at the beginning of 1941, the Luftwaffe switched from the good Messerschmitt Bf 109 E to the very better Bf 109 F!